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ABSTRACT 
In the wake of September 11th terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, 
China began to tout its own terrorist problem in the predominantly Muslim populated 
province of Xinjiang.  Claims that the province’s separatists and extremists threaten 
China’s national security seem contrary to literature focusing on the region’s ethnic 
minorities.  Yet Xinjiang has historically been a restive, rebellious province, and only in 
recent years come fully under Beijing sphere of control.  Throughout the 1990s sporadic 
political violence occurred in Xinjiang and as the geopolitical situation in Central Asia 
changed, Beijing's claim Muslims threat to its national security became a legitimate 
question.  An evaluation of those elements which produce an environment ripe for mass 
organized political violence of such a scale as to threat to China’s sovereignty will 
provide useful understanding the current state of affairs within Xinjiang.  This thesis 
concludes that while each element exists and has existed in varying degrees since 
Chinese rule of the region began, all of the elements have not been simultaneously at a 
level to produce the level of violence that would threaten China’s sovereignty.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) continues to become a dominant 
regional power in Asia, China’s domestic stability is crucial for regional stability.  This 
stability is important for U.S. economic and security interests as well.  The rapid 
economic growth that followed the reforms of Deng Xiaoping created an ever-increasing 
income gap between the coastal provinces and China’s interior regions.  The income 
disparity includes an ethnic dilemma as minority ethnic agrarian and industrial workers 
have not benefited from economic growth as much as their Han counterparts.  This is 
particularly true of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) where Turkic 
Muslims known a Uyghurs make up the largest minority population.  Additionally, 
valuable natural resources are believed to be located in the Tarim Basin (Tarim Pendi), 




Figure 1.   Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China 
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These resources are vital to support the growing population of China.  An increase 
in violence in Xinjiang would create safety concerns for workers attempting to access 
those resources.  Loss of such resources would also force China to rely more heavily on 
imported oil and natural gas, impacting the state financially.  Finally, China’s accession 
to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and hosting of the 2008 Summer Olympic 
Games focus international awareness on China, which has been criticized by human 
rights groups for its hard line stance against ethnic minorities.  Any increase in political 
violence in Xinjiang could erode economic stability due to a lack of investor confidence.   
The upswing of global religious fundamentalism, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, and the uncertainty regarding the stability and capability of the newly formed 
Central Asian states with ethnic ties to the Uyghur population concern the PRC 
leadership.  The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in a lack of security at the borders 
of Former Soviet Union (FSU) Central Asian states.  Heightened fears of external support 
from non-state international religious and ethnic actors for separatism within Xinjiang 
contributed to the creation of the Shanghai Five, a regional security organization formed 
to address border security issues.  Additionally, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
increased trade opportunities have created contacts between ethnic Uyghurs outside 
China and Xinjiang Uyghurs.  Increased Uyghur nationalism within the Xinjiang 
population due to these new ties as well as the creation of ethnic based Central Asian 
states on China’s periphery also concern Beijing.  This makes evaluating the likelihood of 
major armed ethnic violence in Xinjiang important to the United States and its Asian 
allies for five reasons: 
1) Instability in Xinjiang would limit the exploitation of natural resources (oil, 
natural gas, and other resources) and most likely would adversely impact China’s 
economy.  
2) Instability caused by major armed conflict in Xinjiang would affect multiple 
facets of Chinese society internally and could lead to a snowball effect in other provinces 
with ethnic minority problems, such as Tibet.  Additionally, such instability might signal 
to Taiwan an opportunity to declare its independence. 
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3) The internal instability created by large-scale ethno-political violence in 
Xinjiang would directly affect the Central Asian states bordering Xinjiang.  A large 
number of refugees entering adjacent central Asian states would create both economic 
and social issues for these countries;  
4) The United States economy is heavily tied to the Chinese economy.  Any 
instability that affects Chinese economic health would affect the United States as well.  
American companies invested in Chinese companies would suffer from an economic 
crisis in China.  The United States could also be drawn into the conflict due to our force 
disposition in central Asian states and our informal commitment to Taiwan. 
5)  China’s support for the U. S. led Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) remains 
crucial to operations in Central and Southeast Asia.  Instability in Xinjiang could 
adversely impact China’s stance on U. S. basing in Central Asia.   
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the motive, means, and opportunities 
available for political violence in Xinjiang based on various factors and indicators, and 
then assess the prospects for ethnic conflict within the Xinjiang.  The research focuses on 
Xinjiang’s ethnic minorities, of which the Uyghur population is the largest.  Xinjiang’s 
minority ethnicities have historically been opposed to Han rule of what they consider 
their rightful possession.  
The primary question of the thesis research is: Are the elements for a major armed 
ethnic conflict within the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) present and, if 
so, to what extent?  Using a sociological theoretical framework, the thesis also asks 
secondary questions: Were the elements that led to armed ethnic conflict in the past 
similar to the conditions present today?  Does the current situation provide an 
environment conducive to major armed conflict in the near future?   
In order to discuss these research questions, I will approach the problem using a 
two-step process.  First, I will evaluate the motives for political violence within Xinjiang.  
Then, I will evaluate the means available for supporting political violence as well as the 
opportunity structure for engaging in political violence.  The role of ethnicity as a 
contributing factor to the conflict will be included in both steps.  Motive, means, and 
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opportunity have traditionally been impacted by expanding and contracting of 
government policies, restrictions on ethnic minorities, and turbulent changes within the 
region due to war and imperial power struggles.  These factors have often created an 
environment conducive to political violence in Xinjiang.  Therefore I will examine 
impact of current People’s Republic of China (PRC) government policies as well as the 
impact of international non-state actors, economic conditions, and social factors on the 
region.  Academic and policy literature on Xinjiang have predominantly been focused on 
discontent within Uyghur society due to Chinese government policies.  The debate 
among scholars focuses on how PRC economic, political, and social policies have led to 
Uyghur dissatisfaction and promoted violence.  Arguments that allude to unintended 
consequences of government policies are present in some works.  The repressive nature 
of the Chinese government is a recurring theme in all contemporary works of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs).   
This thesis argues that a variety of factors exist within the Xinjiang today that 
create the motive within Uyghur society for people to engage in political violence to 
address their ethnic, economic, social, and political grievances.  Similar factors have led 
to large-scale armed ethno-nationalist conflict in the past when the opportunity structure 
existed.  Such conflict may occur in the future if conditions are again favorable.  Modern 
Chinese policies regarding civil liberties (religious freedom, etc.) and political liberties 
(autonomy) have created animosity toward the government in Xinjiang.  Economic 
policies have favored the coastal regions and the Han nationality, contributing to relative 
economic deprivation for Uyghurs and other minorities, and providing motive for 
collective political violence to address these concerns.  Additionally, external support 
from radical organizations promoting Islamic fundamentalism, although not favored by 
the majority of Uyghurs, provide the additional means for collective political violence 
because such organizations provide funding and arms to those who wish to engage in a 
armed conflict. 
The research for this thesis will comprise a case study of the Xinjiang focusing on 
the motive, means, and opportunity for organized collective political violence and the 
role of ethnicity as a driver for it.  The writings of Owen Lattimore, James Millward, and 
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Peter C. Perdue provide detailed historical accounts of the region under Qing rule with 
focus on the conquest of Xinjiang, the governance of Xinjiang, and the economic, 
political, and social impacts of Chinese rule.  They provide an account of Chinese frontier 
policies that contributed to Uyghur frustration and fostered both greed and grievance.  
These works also provide some insight into the means and opportunity structure of the 
era, which includes Chinese policies, regional instability, and external support from other 
states.  An evaluation of ethnic minority issues during both the Republican and 
Communist eras highlight the effects on Uyghur society of Chinese policies regarding 
religion, education, and culture.  Donald H. McMillen, Linda Benson, and June Teufel 
Dreyer provide detailed historical accounts of the late republican era and early 
communist era within Xinjiang.  An examination of Chinese policies that continued to 
foster grievance during China’s Communist era, particularly the Reform era, highlight the 
constant contracting and expanding social and cultural freedoms which frustrate ethnic 
minorities.  An evaluation of China’s economic modernization highlights the cultural and 
religious exchanges that occurred due to expanded trade.  It will also examine the impact 
of the rise of Islam, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the impact of Uyghur Diaspora 
in post-Soviet Central Asia.  Finally, it will look at the expanding influence of 
international NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch and Uyghur 
Diaspora in Europe and the United States who highlight Chinese policies driven to 
suppress expressions of cultural and religious freedom. 
Chapter II  will discuss the theoretical framework for this thesis, providing a brief 
description of the Relative Deprivation and Rational Choice approaches to political 
violence as the driving forces behind motive, followed by the description of the Enabling 
Environment that facilitates political violence by providing means and opportunity.  The 
chapter will synthesize motive, means, and opportunity with ethnic identity in order to 
provide the framework from which to analyze the prospects for organized collective 
political violence in Xinjiang. 
Chapter III  provides an overview of rebellion and revolt in the pre-Communist 
eras.  The first section focuses on the Xinjiang region from Qing conquest in 1758 until 
Qing collapse in 1911, with emphasis given to the Muslim rebellion from 1863-1877.  
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The second section focuses on the Xinjiang region from the collapse of the Qing dynasty 
through the end of the Chinese Civil War, emphasizing the creation of independent East 
Turkistan states from 1932-1934 and from 1944-1949.  Both sections examine the 
political, social, and economic factors that led to the motivation to engage in armed 
rebellion under Qing rule.   
Chapter IV provides an overview of Uyghur Separatism under the Chinese 
Communist Party.  The first section focuses on state-Uyghur relations under the Chinese 
Communist Party from the creation of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region until the 
death of Mao Zedong.  It examines the political, social, and economic impacts on Uyghur 
society of Mao's revolutionary government, focusing on the Great Leap Forward and the 
Cultural Revolution.  The second section focuses on Xinjiang from the emergence of 
Deng Xiaoping as the leader of the Chinese Communist Party until 2005.  It examines the 
effects of economic reforms, the loosening and tightening of civil and political liberties 
throughout the era, and the anti-terrorism crackdown on ethnic Uyghurs after 9/11.  
Focus will be given to the rise of ethno-nationalism in the Xinjiang and its impact on the 
motivation to engage in political violence to address collective grievances, as well as to 
obtain selective economic and social.  This section will also examine the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and creation of Central Asian states with ethnic overtones, the rise of 
Islamic theocratic nation-states, external support from Uyghur Diaspora, and support 
from radical Islamic fundamentalist groups with regard to their ability to create 
opportunities for armed conflict within Xinjiang.   
The conclusion will summarize the findings of Uyghur propensity to engage in 
mass political violence.  It will apply the theoretical framework to qualitatively analyze 
the prospects for major ethnic political violence in order to isolate indicators of a 
favorable environment for major armed conflict.  It will evaluate cost versus benefit of 
such violence within the governmental framework and determine if the crossover point of 
risk versus gain can materialize in the XUAR under current conditions.  It will also give 
policy recommendations for how the United States should respond to any large-scale 
violence in XUAR given the current economic ties with China and U. S. national interests 
in regional stability in Central, Southeast, and East Asia. 
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II. ELEMENTS OF MASS ORGANIZED POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The basic theoretical proposition of this thesis is that three independent variables 
must be present for effective collective political violence to occur: motive, means, and 
opportunity (See Figure 2).  This does not account for random collective violence, which 
may occur in conjunction with organized political protests or may occur separately due to 
radical elements of a larger group.  It neither suggests that in the absence of one or more 
of these elements political violence cannot occur.  Rather the argument is that organized 
collective political violence will likely have these features and that the stronger the 
motive, the greater the means and the opportunity, the more likely organized collective 
political violence will occur.  The evaluation of the propensity for collective political 
violence must also synthesize ethnicity with motive, opportunity, and means in any case 
where the conflict has an ethnic element, as does ours.  As an intervening variable, ethnic 
identity becomes an integral part of the equation when evaluating the motive, means, and 
opportunity structure for political violence.  Ethnic identity, combined with 
discrimination and repression, will likely increase motive and certain elements of means 
for collective action within an ethnic group.  To support this proposition we will discuss 
motive separately from opportunity and means; and will discuss ethnicity as required to 
amplify its impact.  After our initial discussion of ethnic identity, we will discuss motive 
in terms of grievance and greed followed by the means and opportunity structure. 
 
Motive Means Opportunity 
1) Social, economic, or political 
grievance 
2) Environmentally scarce 
resources (mineral and oil 
deposits, water reserves) 
3) Greed (political or economic 
power) 
1) Leadership and manpower 
2) Supply and logistics 
3) Financing 
4) Diaspora and external state 
support 
1) Internal instability  
2) External conflict  
3) Political changes in adjacent 
states 
4) Government collapse 
Figure 2.   Elements of Political Violence 
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B. ETHNICITY 
In the discussion of ethnicity, one must first have a suitable definition of the term.  
Although several variations exist, it is generally accepted that ethnicity consists of 
common identifiable characteristics such as race, religion, language, territorial 
attachment, and shared ancestry.1  The two modern schools of thought attribute the 
salience of ethnicity to either primordialism or instrumentalism.2  Primordialism argues 
that the common characteristics mentioned above strengthen ethnic salience because they 
create psychological sources of ethnic identity.  One identifies with a particular group 
because he has common characteristics with the group.3  An example of a primordialist 
argument might be that ethnic elites, who might otherwise distance themselves from their 
own ethnicity along class lines, would identify with and support those members of their 
ethnicity who suffer economically under a repressive regime.  Another example might be 
the galvanization of ethnic identity across class boundaries due to the denial of an ethnic 
group’s ability to practice its language, religion, or social customs.    
The competing school argues that the common characteristics are a manipulation 
of ethnicity by ethnic elites to serve their political goals.  Instrumentalists contend that 
ethnic identity can be formed and reformed based on those political goals.4   Ethnic elites 
seeking political power may manipulate ethnicity as a means to politicize issues and rally 
support from their pursuit of their political goals.  Ethnicity often becomes an issue 
unintentionally, at which point primordialist and instrumentalist arguments may overlap.  
When government policies or practices that promote economic growth but repress or 
deny social mobility, group members may naturally align with their coworkers while 
ethnic elites can be use the issue to strengthen ethnic identity.  If a cultural division of 
 
1 Susan Olzak, "Contemporary Ethnic Mobilization," Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 9 (1983), 356; see also 
Ronnie D. Lipschultz, "Seeking a State of One's Own: An Analytical Framework for Assessing Ethnic and Sectarian 
Conflicts," in Beverly Crawford and Ronnie D. Lipschultz, ed., The Myth of "Ethnic Conflict": Politics, Economics, 
and "Cultural" Violence, (Berkeley, 1998), 44-78. 
2 Earl Conteh-Morgan, Collective Political Violence: An Introduction to the Theories and Cases of Violent 
Conflict, (New York and London, 2004), 197. 
3 Conteh-Morgan, 199-200; see also Dmitry Gorenburg, "Not with One Voice: An Explanation of Intragroup 
Variation in Nationalist Sentiment," World Politics, 53, (October 2000), 115-142. 
4 Ibid. 
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labor results from a combination of economic growth and government policies, ethnic 
salience may be increased if an ethnic group is denied job mobility.  Concurrently, 
ethnicity may then be politicized.5  Both views on ethnicity can be helpful in explaining 
why ethnicity becomes an important element that influences motive, as well as means and 
opportunity to which we now turn. 
C. MOTIVE 
While discussing motive as a driving force behind political violence may seem to 
be a given, the debate over exactly what motivates individuals to collective political 
violence is ongoing.  The discourse on political violence attempts to determine the root 
causes of political violence.  Such determinations are beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Various arguments on root causes ranging from deprivation to environmental scarcities to 
greed are all plausible.  More often then not, though, an argument based on deprivation as 
a root cause can also be argued as economically driven.  One man’s grievance is another 
man’s greed and the determination of whether the root causes of political violence are 
either one or the other often bogs down the discussion.  For our purposes, what scholars 
argue to be root causes of collective political violence, we will categorize as motive for 
collective political violence.  It is useful, though, to understand the two leading 
approaches to determining the root causes of collective political violence.  These two 
approaches are important because they provide the theoretical framework for the 
independent variable of motive and assist in the evaluation of political, social, and 
economic conditions as contributing factors to motive.  Therefore, a basic examination of 
these approaches is appropriate in order to provide a point of departure when determining 
whether motives for collective political violence exist and to what level they permeate the 
ethnic group. 
The first approach attributes such action to a response to frustration generated by 
deprivation of social, political, or economic opportunities that they perceive to be out of 
reach for varying reasons.  Proponents of this model cite grievance as the root cause of 
collective political violence.  This approach focuses on “relative deprivation” as the 
 
5 Olzak, 356-357; Lipschultz, 44-78. 
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explanation for collective political violence.  The second approach attributes such action 
to the desire for personal gain, whether social, political, economic, or psychological.  
Proponents of this model cite selective incentives, often characterized as greed, as the 
root cause of collective political violence.  The leading theory in this school takes a 
“rational choice” approach to collective political violence.   
1. Relative Deprivation 
Relative deprivation derives from the frustration aggression theory originally 
proposed in 1939 by John Dollard et al, which purports that people resort to violence due 
to frustration, specifically “that the occurrence of aggressive behavior always 
presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration 
always leads to some form of aggression.”6  According to this hypothesis, any type of 
frustration encountered by a person will eventually result in the expression of aggression.  
This argument, however, does not seem to take into consideration the human capability 
of delaying gratification and overcoming emotional weakness.  The strength of this 
theory is not in whether a person acts on their frustration or not, but that their frustration 
creates aggressive emotions.  Such aggressive emotions can be turned to action given the 
right catalyst. 
Ted Robert Gurr, in his seminal book Why Men Rebel, developed the relative 
deprivation approach into a fully developed theory of collective violence.  Gurr examined 
aggressive emotions that become aggressive action.  He elaborated on the frustration 
aggression hypothesis by attributing frustration to relative deprivation, which he defines 
as “actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value 
capabilities.”7  In his theory when people’s ability to obtain or achieve those objects, 
goals, or positions in life that they desire does not match their expectations of what they 
should be able to achieve, frustration develops.  Abilities and expectations may be 
compared along many avenues: time (past vs. present, present vs. future); classes 
(peasants vs. bourgeoisie); or ethnicity are some examples.  Gurr proposes three types of 
 
6 John Dollard et al, Frustration and Aggression, (New Haven: 1939), 1. 
7 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, (Princeton: 1970), 24. 
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relative deprivation: decremental deprivation, aspirational deprivation, and progressive 
deprivation.  Of these three approaches, the most useful when conducting a chronological 
analysis of Uyghur society is progressive deprivation due to the expanding and 
contracting of government policies within Xinjiang throughout the communist era.  
Progressive deprivation occurs when a “more-or-less steady improvement in peoples’ 
value position generates expectations about continued improvement.”8  A group’s 
expectations rise when its ability to achieve its aspirations improves.  When that ability 
suddenly disappears and expectations for continued improvement remain, frustration 
occurs.  Gurr argues that if the degree of relative deprivation is high enough, and the use 
of political violence may improve a group’s situation, then the group will engage in 
collective political violence against the source of their discontent in order to remove their 
frustration.   
Since relative deprivation is a subjective comparison using the viewpoint of the 
aggrieved as its basis, and because so many comparisons can be drawn, virtually any 
group can claim they are deprived.  Because of this fundamental flaw, we shall narrow 
our scope when examining the evidence that supports relative deprivation as a motive in 
Xinjiang.  Our comparisons will view relative deprivation in terms of the conflict as 
claimed by the Chinese government, namely ethnicity.  Our ethnic analysis will examine 
Uyghur society compared to Han within Xinjiang and Uyghur society in China compared 
to Uyghur society in adjacent nation states.  We will also include a chronological analysis 
due to the Chinese government’s changing policies and their repercussions within 
Uyghur society.  These comparisons will be based on evidence presented by third party 
observers from various NGOs as well as ethnic Diaspora in order to more plausibly 
determine its value as motive.  I argue that relative deprivation alone does not equate to 
violence, but provides motive for political violence if, as Gurr claims, the group believes 
“that they stand a chance of relieving some of their discontent through violence.”9   
 
 
8 Gurr, 52. 
9 Ibid., 210. 
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2. Rational Choice 
The rational choice approach to collective political violence proposes that 
individuals engage in collective action for some personal benefit, which may be of an 
economic, social, psychological, or erotic in nature.10  This argument purports that when 
individuals participate within a group for the advancement of collective good, they do not 
solely do it for the group as a whole, but rather as a means of obtaining a collective good 
while simultaneously achieving some personal benefit.  In The Logic of Collective Action, 
Public Goods, and the Theory of Groups, Mancur Olson argues that group behavior does 
not necessarily follow the same pattern as individual behavior.  In general a rational, self-
interested individual will pursue interests that benefit him or her personally.  However, in 
groups where those same interests are collectively sought, the same rational, self-
interested person will likely not pursue the collective good.11  In large groups individual 
action for collective good often requires coercion on the group’s part, because the cost for 
engaging in collective action is greater than the benefits.  Coercion, or the offering or 
withholding of a selective incentive, spurs the individual to action because “the 
recalcitrant individual can be ostracized, and the cooperative individual can be invited 
into the center of the charmed circle.”12  However, even if coercion is used the decision to 
act collectively still stems from personal desires for individual gain.  It is a cost versus 
benefit analysis unique to the individual’s value structure.  Therefore rational choice in its 
most basic form involves individual gains to be made during the pursuit of collective 
action according to his value structure.  Since a person chooses to engage in political 
violence for a selective incentive, the most argued incentive is economic gain.   
Economic gain provides rationale for both social scientists and economists.  Paul 
Collier argues that it motivates people to political violence far more often than grievance.  
In his assessment political violence remains an endeavor in which people engage when it 
is profitable to do so.  Economic conditions such as dependence on primary commodity 
 
10 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, (New York: 1965), 61. 
11 Ibid., 13-14. 
12 Ibid., 60-61. 
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exports, low average income of the country, and slow growth are more likely to be linked 
to political violence than grievance.13  The desire to control primary commodity exports 
in order to control the wealth generated, provides more incentive than grievance against 
the government.  In the terminology of Collier and Hoeffler, greed and economic 
viability have stronger explanatory power than grievance in such cases.14  Greed and 
economic power can also be seen in ethnic conflicts associated with scarce or contested 
natural resources.  Resources most frequently linked to civil conflict in this and other 
world regions are diamonds and other gemstones, oil and natural gas, timber and illicit 
drugs.15  The conflict in Sierra Leone falls in this category.  Although the rebel group 
arrived at the bargaining table with a litany of grievances, a peace agreement could not be 
agreed upon until the rebel leader was offered not only the vice-presidency, but also the 
position of Minister of Finance, suggesting that the mining of diamonds and its economic 
gains contributed more to the underlying cause of the conflict than grievance.16  
The importance of non-economic incentives must be considered as well when 
discussing rational choice.  Arguably it is more difficult to assess social, psychological, 
and erotic or spiritual benefits than economic benefits; however, such benefits cannot be 
discounted and must be taken into consideration when contemplating ethnic based 
movements.  Two characteristics of ethnicity offer examples of intangible benefits: 
religion and language.  The  repression of religion or the use of language, while a form of 
deprivation, make the recapture of the ability to practice such integral facets of ethnicity a 
selective incentive unique to the ethnic collectivity.  Each person’s individual desire to 
obtain this incentive will vary, but the importance of the symbolism of religion and 
language to ethnic identity may well loom large in both the individual and collective 
realm. 
 
13 Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Causes and Their Implications for Policy,” in Chester A. Crocker, Fen 
Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aell, Eds., Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, 
(Washington, D.C.: 2001), 151. 
14 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, Working paper, World Bank, October 
2001. 
15 Michael L. Ross, “Oil, Drugs, and Diamonds: The Varying Roles of Natural Resources in Civil War”, in Karen 
Ballentine and Jake Sherman, eds., The Political Economy of Armed Conflict. Beyond Greed & Grievance, (Boulder 
and London: 2003),  47-73. 
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3. Convergence of Relative Deprivation and Rational Choice  
Neither grievance nor greed can account for every ethnic based political 
movement.  Barbara Salert points out several flaws in both relative deprivation theory 
and rational choice theory.  The lack of economic deprivation of many modern 
revolutionary leaders does not fit the profile.  She also argues that people experiencing 
severe deprivation may be more concerned with survival than political rebellion.17 With 
regard to rational choice theory she argues that large-scale group rebellion does not 
always include selective incentives great enough to offset the costs of rebellion.  Her 
examples include both the French and Russian revolutions, in which severe penalties and 
lack of economic and political incentives to the lower classes did not dissuade political 
violence.18  Even though these theories cannot account for every instance of collective 
political violence, they can both contribute significantly to the analysis of motive.  Even 
Gurr and Collier acknowledge this.  Gurr accounts for it by placing relative deprivation 
and ethnicity in the collective action theory framework, citing selective incentives based 
on ethnic identity.  Collier provides the exception that societies where the ethnically 
dominate group represents 90-95 percent of the population, grievance will likely be a 
driving force for political violence than greed.  It is clear to me that some people will act 
for personal gain and others will act for what they perceive as morally right.  Some will 
act regardless of the costs, while others will wait until the cost benefit ratio is favorable.  
People who benefit from selective incentives would seem to be more limited in scope 
than those who benefit from the redress of grievance, but grievance would seem to be the 
better means of mobilization for leaders attempting to recruit large numbers of 
supporters.  Thus lays the possibility of grievance and greed complementing each other in 
the pursuit of ethnic political violence within the framework of collective action theory.  
For collective political violence to occur, motive must combine with means and 
opportunity, the subject of the next section. 
 
16 Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Causes and Their Implications for Policy,” 151. 
17 Barbara Salert, Revolutions and Revolutionaries: Four Theories, (New York: 1976), 63-64. 
18 Ibid., 45-47. 
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D.  MEANS AND OPPORTUNITY  
Means and opportunity represents critical elements for collective political 
violence.  Without means and opportunity, motive will likely not be enough to ignite 
collective political violence.  Proponents of both greed and grievance cite means and 
opportunity within their theories.  Their discussion acknowledges the importance of 
conditions to a collective political movement.  This thesis will explore means and 
opportunity within Xinjiang’s minority population, particularly current Uyghur society, 
because it is within this environment that they synthesize with motive to produce political 
violence.  Kumar Ramakshira describes a “functional and political space” that can be 
exploited by organizations opposed to the state19, what I will term means.  The functional 
space includes the extent of membership, finance, member expertise, and geography, 
primarily internal means; while the political space includes outside sympathy from 
similar groups, local root causes of discontent, and outside support for opposition to the 
state, primarily external means.20  We categorize the local root causes within the 
independent variable of motive, so for our purposes, means may then be viewed as the 
administrative, logistical, and manpower elements needed to effectively plan and execute 
extended operations against the state.  Obtaining the structure to support membership and 
operations requires mobilization of forces within the ethnic group opposed to the state.   
Ethnic mobilization as a part of the means is the primary source for 
administrative, logistical, and manpower elements.  Ethnic mobilization is the 
responsibility of the ethnic leadership, which makes ethnic leadership a key ingredient.  
Leadership must then be legitimate in order to mobilize the group.  Within the Weberian 
model three types of authority provide leaders with the ability to exert their will on the 
people.  Within a society where an ethnic group is in opposition to the state the first type, 
legal authority belongs to the government.  The ethnic leadership typically attains its 
authority from traditional or charismatic means or a combination of the two.  A leader 
 
19 Kumar Ramakshira, “Countering Radical Islam in Southeast Asia: The Need to Confront the Functional and 
Ideological ‘Enabling Environment’”, in Paul J. Smith, ed., Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational 
Challenges to States and Regional Stability, (Armonk, NY: 2005), 146. 
20 Ibid. 
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who holds both traditional and charismatic authority can be quite dangerous for the state 
with which he is opposed.  However, leadership that uses charismatic or traditional 
authority will likely use personal networks to fill the bureaucratic structure required to 
manage the administrative, logistical, and manpower elements.  This leaves the group 
vulnerable to the loss of a charismatic leader, and possibly to the loss of a traditional 
leader as well if no other traditional authority can replace him.  Leadership also operates 
within the political space as well. 
The political space includes the psychological and social elements used to draw 
support from external actors by a group in opposition to the state.  Here the leadership 
takes an active role in the political space.  External support often generates tangible 
resources in the form of intelligence, additional manpower recruitment, safe-havens, and 
funds.21  Rallying support from domestic and international requires that the leadership 
clearly articulation of motives, means, and goals.  A leader who cannot will likely fail to 
convince others to support the organization.  The effective use of rhetoric can increase 
the perception of deprivation within the group and generate external sympathy.  The most 
likely target of such rhetoric is geared to the actors who have the economic and political 
ability to support the organization: ethnic Diaspora, external states and international 
NGOs. 
Ethnic Diaspora and external states contribute significantly to the enabling 
environment.  Diaspora contributes in three significant ways.  First, they nurse grievances 
because they often have the political freedom to do so.  Second, they are often financially 
independent, allowing them to fund separatist's activities.  Third, they may have political 
leverage with foreign governments who can in turn pressure the state to accommodate the 
ethnic minority through unilateral actions or multilateral actions via the United Nations.  
Diaspora can be dangerous because they conduct such activities dislocated from the 
dangers of the political conflict.  Their actions may cause greater problems for the ethnic 
 
21 Ramakshira, 154. 
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population at home if the regime’s responds to ethnic unrest with repression.22  External 
states may impose economic sanctions or intervene militarily to stem ethnic repression.  
NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch impact the enabling 
environment in different ways.  As independent actors within the international system, 
NGOs can provide analysis and recommendations with little fear of reprisal against the 
ethnic population due to their actions.  Unlike Diaspora, NGOs typically do not have 
family linkages that may be manipulated in order to prevent publication of its findings.  
Although NGOs overtly support resistance by the ethnic minority, but like Diaspora, they 
do exert pressure on the United Nations and other governments to address grievances of 
ethnic minorities.   
The likelihood that grievances induced by social inequality and economic 
deprivation will lead to violent political protests is also mitigated by other factors such as: 
a low degree of trust in political authorities combined with a high degree of belief that the 
use of violence by dissident groups in the past has helped their course; semi-repressive 
political structures in intermediate political regimes; defects of the democratic order such 
as low accountability and shallow patterns of political representation; and ‘state 
weakness’.23  As a part of the enabling environment these factors fall under the category 
of state actions that lead to opportunity.  In our discussion, the factors associated with the 
Chinese state are primarily the areas of political trust, repressive political structures, and 
accountability of the political order.  Our analysis of the Chinese state and its role in 
affecting means and opportunity will focus on those areas mentioned above. 
E. APPLICATION 
In order to determine conditions favorable for ethnic political violence exist 
within Xinjiang’s Uyghur population, an historical and contemporary examination of the 
socio-economic and political aspects of the ethnic society’s relationship to the Chinese 
 
22 Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Causes and Their Implications for Policy,” in Chester A. Crocker, Fen 
Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aell, Eds., Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, 
(Washington, D.C.: 2001), 155. 
23 Aurel Croissant, “Political Violence, Extremism and the Transformation to Democracy and Market Economy,” 
paper presented at the Bertelsmann Foundation Conference “Transformation Thinkers,” Berlin, 5-10 October, 2005. 
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state must be undertaken.  Under these auspices this thesis will analyze motives for 
political violence using the relative deprivation and rational choice approaches discussed 
above.  We will evaluate means and opportunity by examining the conditions of the 
political and functional spaces within the enabling environment as well as the Chinese 
state's impact.  By evaluating Chinese-Uyghur interactions within this framework, this 
thesis will assess the motives and environment within Xinjiang to determine if favorable 
conditions exist for large-scale collective political violence against the Chinese state.  In 
Xinjiang, ethnic distinctions such as religion, language, customs, and history, which are 
likely irreconcilable under the current regime, provide an intervening variable that shapes 
both motive and means.   
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III. UNDER THE EMPIRE: FROM MANCHU RULE TO 
NATIONALIST RULE 
A. OVERVIEW OF QING ERA (1759-1911) 
In 1759 the Qing Dynasty finally completed its campaign in the far northwest 
region.  The result was the acquisition of a land mass larger than Alaska that accounts for 
one-sixth the total land mass of modern-day China.24  The goal of the Qing emperor was 
not necessarily to create an additional province, but to create a barrier region between 
China proper and those Central Asian threats from nomadic tribes to its population that 
could financially sustain itself.25  The Qing governed this area through a military 
settlement and deployed its forces on a rotational basis.26  The local system of rule by 
local tribal elders called begs remained in place in order to avoid resistance among the 
local Muslims.  In 1765 a rebellion occurred in the far southwest city of Ush, but was 
quickly quelled by Qing forces.27  Following this minor uprising the Qing ruled relatively 
peacefully until the 1820s.  During the 1820s a series of incursions into Xinjiang by the 
Kokand Khanate troubled Qing rule in Xinjiang.  The Kokand Khanate attempted to 
regain its foothold in Xinjiang through militarily incursions, a constant threat to Qing rule 
of the area that also created a drain on the imperial treasury for defense of the region.28  
The Qing responded with a trade embargo after a major incursion the 1826.  In the 1830 
the Kokand Khanate responded to this embargo with a major push into the region.  
Militarily the Qing repelled the Kokand forces, but in 1831 acceded to Kokand's trade 
demands and entered into what has been called “China’s first unequal treaty.”29
 
24 James A. Millward, Beyond the Pass: Ethnicity and Economy in Chinese Central Asia, (Stanford: 1998), 20. 
25 Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
2005), 336. 
26 Millward, Beyond the Pass, 21. 
27 Perdue, 337; Millward, Beyond the Pass, 124-125. 
28 Millward, Beyond the Pass, 34-35; Joseph Fletcher, "The Heyday of the Ch'ing Order in Mongolia, Sinkiang, 
and Tibet," in The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 10 Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Part I, ed. Denis Twitchett and John 
K. Fairbank, (London: 1978), 
29 Fletcher, 378. 
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From the treaty with Kokand in 1831 until the Muslim uprisings in 1863, the Qing 
ruled Xinjiang unchallenged.  Economic problems, due to Xinjiang’s inability to sustain 
itself financially, forced the central government to send annual monetary shipment to 
augment Xinjiang’s budget deficits.  Notwithstanding, it was a time of increased Han 
migration to the region supported by government incentives.  As the Opium Wars and the 
Taiping Rebellion drained China’s imperial treasury, the economic situation in Xinjiang 
worsened due to the loss of annual shipments. 30   When the Muslim rebellion in 
neighboring Gansu province erupted, Xinjiang’s Muslims rebelled also.  The Qing 
government, attempting to suppress the Taiping rebellion was in no position to meet the 
rebellion militarily and Xinjiang slipped into chaos.  Russia moved troops into the Ili 
river valley in northwestern Xinjiang under the pretext of restoring order, while Yaqub 
Beg consolidated his power in southwestern Xinjiang.31  The Qing finally quelled the 
Taiping rebellion in 1865, and spent the next twelve years reclaiming Gansu and 
Xinjiang.  The government established by Yaqub Beg found limited recognition in the 
international community and found no support from external states when the Qing 
returned to Xinjiang.  They recaptured the area held by Yaqub Beg in 1877 and he died 
during the fighting, by all accounts from a self-inflicted wound.  The Qing then began 
negotiations for the return of the Ili region from Russia, which was completed in 1881.   
In 1884 after bitter discussion in the Qing court, Xinjiang along with Taiwan were 
made provinces.  Xinjiang now had all the rights and privileges of very other Chinese 
province, to include the mode of government.  The Qing scrapped the beg system of local 
rule and established the full bureaucratic system of government.32  Increased Han 
migration into Xinjiang continued, but economically the new province failed to blossom.  
As the Qing dynasty further declined economic conditions deteriorated as well.  Han 
immigrants often left their Xinjiang farms and returned to their home provinces, leaving 
 
30 These “conflicts” were primarily the Opium Wars of 1840 and 1860. 
31 Yaqub Beg had no role in precipitation of the rebellion itself.  He opportunistically grasped power in Xinjiang 
and his government established itself with questionable legitimacy in the international arena.  Several sources provide 
insightful information into his person and his regime in Xinjiang.  For the purpose of this paper the period of his 
government and rule are a matter of fact and are outside the scope of this analysis of Muslim/Chinese relations. 
32 James A. Millward and Nabijan Tursun, "Political History and Strategies of Control, 1884-1978," in Xinjiang: 
China's Muslim Borderland, ed. Frederick S Starr, (Armonk, NY: 2004), 63-65. 
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untended plots of land for local Muslims, primarily the group known today as Uyghurs, 
to claim.33  As the anti-Qing sentiment increased within China, factions within Xinjiang 
also emerged.  In 1911 when the Qing was toppled, so was the Qing administration in 
Xinjiang.  From the revolution emerged the warlord era in China, from which Xinjiang 
would fall prey as well.  
B. MOTIVE, MEANS, AND OPPORTUNITY DURING THE QING ERA 
As stated previously, the determination of motive based on historical sources 
alone is difficult; however, evaluating the evolution of state policies that negatively 
impacted the ethnic minority helps to understand the layered nature of collective memory 
within an ethnic group.  In the case of minority policy within Xinjiang during the Qing 
dynasty, the initial policy of non-interference with local customs and laws reflected Qing 
awareness of the danger of overburdening the local populous immediately following 
conquest.  Their initial treatment of the Muslim population of Xinjiang mirrored their 
policies in China proper with a few key exceptions.  Local minority leaders retained there 
position of authority and ruled as before with the exception that the local military 
authorities held overarching authority for the region.34  The Qing reduced the taxes levied 
on the indigenous population compared to the former taxes levied by the Kokand 
Khanate in an attempt to offset any resentment of Qing authority in the region.  However, 
unlike within China proper, law and order were based on both Islamic law and Qing 
Imperial law, with local peoples subject to local laws except in the most egregious crimes 
against other local peoples or family, crimes against the Han or the government; while 
Han soldiers and civilians were subject to Imperial law.35  The Qing decisions to 
maintain the local minority ruling structure through the use of local begs, lower taxes, 
and allow minority crimes to be handled within Muslim courts created little incentive to 
rise up against the occupiers.  To the average person life was not much different after the 
conquest than before.   
 
33 Millward and Tursun, 66-67. 
34 Perdue, 338-340.  
35 Millward, Beyond the Pass, 121-122. 
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Initially Qing policies favored the local populous, primarily leaders and 
indigenous merchants.  Although Han merchants were allowed access to Xinjiang in 
fairly large numbers to “accelerate Xinjiang’s commercial development,”36 their 
activities remain limited.   Chinese merchant trade within Xinjiang was primarily with the 
Qing military under government guidelines.37  Han merchants could neither cross 
Xinjiang’s western borders to conduct trade (while local merchants could trade beyond 
the borders of Qing control), nor exploit indigenous farmers during harvest periods. 38  In 
addition to these policies, abuse of power created the friction between Muslims and the 
Qing government in the first few years due to Han officials conduct, including extortion, 
and allegations of licentiousness and rape.39  This early friction culminated in an incident 
dubbed the Ush rebellion.  The Ush rebellion sparked from “the impressment of 240 East 
Turkistan men in March 1765 to transport oleaster.”40  This met with vicious response 
from the locals and resulted in the Qing having to send military forces to quell the 
disturbance.41  The significance of the Ush rebellion lies not in its occurrence but in the 
changes in policy implemented afterward.  After this incident the Chinese population and 
the Muslim population were segregated to ensure further such incidents.42  This 
segregation combined with Qing economic policies presented little motive for Muslim 
rebellion against Qing rule.   
The Kokand incursions of the 1820s made it clear to the local population that the 
previous rulers still held interests in the region.  It also provided an external means to 
support collective violence against the Qing government in support of the Kokand forces 
when the opportunity arrived.  This external support, even though in the form of direct 
invasion, would provide the manpower and weapons for those who wished to rise up 
against the Qing.  The extent to which the Kokand could provide personnel and 
 
36 Millward, Beyond the Pass, 116. 
37 Perdue, 120-121. 
38 Ibid., 122-124. 
39 Throughout this chapter references to the Chinese population include both Chinese and ruling Manchu peoples. 
40 Millward, Beyond the Pass, 124 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 124-125. 
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equipment to local Muslims to be used against the Qing is debatable.  When the 
opportunity presented itself for Muslims to align themselves with the Kokand forces 
against the Qing garrisons during the 1830 invasion, the question of local ethnic minority 
loyalty became highlighted because the Muslims had been living separate from the 
Chinese population. Chinese merchants holed up in the cities under siege believed rumors 
of Muslim local support during the incursion.  This elicited a brutal response by these 
Han merchants.  Although Qing officials called for restraint, their calls went unheeded 
and resulted in the deaths of several Muslims.  After the Kokand invasion the Qing 
investigated the above mentioned incident and although there was inconclusive evidence 
that the general population supported Kokand, the Qing decided that the government's 
policy needed to change.43  An increase in Han immigration into the region occurred, 
primarily merchants and their dependents from internal provinces.44  Thus began an era 
in which relative deprivation influenced Muslim motive against the Qing government. 
The Qing government had hoped that the increased immigration into Xinjiang 
would create a double benefit: first, Xinjiang would finally become self sufficient; 
second, Xinjiang would populated by loyal Qing subjects.  Neither benefit happened.  
The influx of Han into Xinjiang only exacerbated ethnic minority-Han relations.  With 
the influx of settlers into the region land suitable for farming became increasingly 
limited.  Qing officials removed locals accused of supporting the Kokand invasion from 
their land and gave said land to Han immigrants.45  When comparing their lot to that of 
the newly arrived Han population, the local Muslim population was subjected to 
economic and physical deprivation by the Qing.  Such policies and the resulting disparity 
in quality of life before and after policy shifts would contribute to motive for removal of 
the Qing and Han from Xinjiang according to Gurr theory of Relative Deprivation. 
This shift in policy alone would have contributed to motive against the Qing, but 
the inability for Xinjiang to pay for its own costs for Qing occupation exacerbated the 
situation.  With the combined costs of fighting the Opium Wars and the Taiping 
 
43 Millward, Beyond the Pass, 225. 
44 Ibid., 227-228. 
45 Ibid., 229. 
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rebellion, the Qing emperor was unable to continue to financially support Xinjiang.  
Taxation of the local populous began to increase in order to offset the complete loss of 
revenue from the central government in Beijing.46  On top of this taxation local 
merchants continued to compete with Han merchants and by the time of the Muslim 
uprising in 1864 tensions within Xinjiang were high and both economic incentives and 
decremental deprivation contributed to Muslim resentment of the Qing Empire.   
From the elevation of Xinjiang to province level status until the collapse of the 
Qing dynasty government excessive taxation of the general population increased as the 
Qing dynasty continued its downward spiral and remained unable to meet its fiscal 
requirements.47  The departure of many Han families due to the excessive taxation and 
the subsequent influx of Muslim families to take over these empty plots of land 
somewhat alleviated tension. 48  These latter two factors combined with anti-Qing 
sentiment among both Han Chinese and Muslims led to cooperation during the Chinese 
revolution.  Overall during Qing rule changing policies created a declining state of affairs 
for Xinjiang's ethnic minorities economically.  The events that led to Qing shifts in policy 
also left mistrust and bitterness.  Both grievance and greed contributed to motive. 
The means to conduct an armed rebellion favored the ethnic minorities in 
manpower from the beginning.  The Qing military capability held the upper hand 
throughout the latter half of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century, but 
the Qing government's desire to have Xinjiang finance itself meant that soldiers spent 
more time farming than training, leaving their martial arts skills to atrophy.49  By the time 
of the Muslim rebellions of 1864, the Qing military in Xinjiang no longer held the heavy 
advantage it once did, enabling the Muslim population to bring to bear their means of 
resistance. 
 
46 Hodong Kim, Holy War in China: the Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese Central Asia, 1864-1877, 
(Stanford: 2004), 32-33. 
47 Ibid., 32-33; see also Millward, Beyond the Pass, 239. 
48 Millward and Tursun, 67. 
49 Millward, Beyond the Pass, 240-241. 
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The opportunity to rebel would seem to have been available almost constantly 
during Qing rule.  Anger and resentment toward the Qing and the Chinese grew more 
steadily as the burdens created from Qing taxes and Han immigration grew.  The Qing 
Empire, although on the dynastic decline, did not become a weak state until the western 
powers arrived.  The costs of the First Opium War and the subsequent Taiping rebellion 
reduced the Qing in both financial and military strength to the point where opportunity, 
motive, and means aligned.   
Although viewing such a period through an historical lens complicates analyzing 
such phenomena as what in modern terms is called political violence, the motivating 
factors and opportunity for armed rebellion can be seen fairly clearly, while the clarity of 
means is limited to the manpower advantage of the local population. 
C. OVERVIEW OF REPUBLICAN ERA 
The Republican Era most notably was a time of constant change and chaos within 
Xinjiang.  The period was rife with conflict, conspiracy, and revolt.  Some of this came 
from internal forces and some came from the interstate political maneuvering due to 
colonialism, Japanese expansion, and the rise of the Soviet Union.   From 1911-1944 
Xinjiang was ruled by consecutive quasi-dictators who ostensibly served the nationalist 
government, but in reality ruled as they wished.  The first of these was Yang Zengxin, 
followed by Jin Shuren, and Sheng Shicai.   
In 1911 revolutionary elements rallied both Han and Muslim minorities around 
the anti-Manchu banner, enabling the ousting of Qing ruling elements in Xinjiang.50  
Yuan Da Hua, the last Qing governor handed power to Yang Zengxin as he fled Xinjiang.  
Due to the geographic isolation and relative weakness of the new Chinese republic, the 
newly inaugurated Chinese President Yuan Shi Kai confirmed this appointment of Yang, 
the commissioner of judicial affairs under the Qing, as governor of Xinjiang.51  Over the 
next three years Yang consolidated his power through a series of political and military 
 
50 Millward and Tursun, 67. 
51 Andrew D. W. Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican 
Sinkiang 1911-1949, (New York: 1996), 11-12; Millward and Tursun, 68. 
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maneuvers which included the granting of political positions to opposition leaders as well 
as their assassinations in some cases.52  He primarily followed the Qing example of rule 
for appeasing ethnic minorities by maintaining ethnic Muslims in lower positions of 
power, but surrounding himself at the higher levels with close friends and family.53  
However, Yang did not attempt to assimilate the Muslim minority, instead allowing them 
to live according to their customs within the confines of the limitations he set forth.  
Yang also did not overtax the minority population; neither did he remove them from their 
land.54   
Economically, however, Yang had limited options.  The lack of monetary 
subsidies from the Qing government in the final years of the dynasty continued through 
its collapse and into Yang’s tenure.  The lack of financial support from the Chinese 
central government had somewhat been offset by Xinjiang’s trade with Russia.  
Xinjiang’s economy became intricately linked with Russia.55  The trade rights given to 
Russia after the withdrawal of Russian forces from the Ili region in 1881 had led to 
Russia becoming Xinjiang’s most important trading partner.  The loss of trade due to the 
Russian revolution resulted in “severe shortages of cloth, sugar, fuel, and industrial 
products,”56  as well as lost revenue on Xinjiang’s exports to Russia, which included 
“cotton and pastoral products.”57  Yang attempted to handle this through additional 
currency, printing no less than four different currencies and manipulating the exchange 
rates in favor of the local government.  Yang was able to keep his hold on power through 
the economic downturn and once trade resumed with the new Soviet Union, Xinjiang’s 




52 Forbes, 12-13. 
53 Millward and Tursun, 68; Forbes, 14. 
54 Forbes, 15. 
55 Forbes, 28-29. 
56 Millward and Tursun, 70. 
57 Ibid. 
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trade with China proper.”58  Yang’s autocratic policies caught up to him eventually as his 
rule came to an abrupt halt in 1928 with his assassination at a dinner party in Urumchi by 
his closest advisors.59   
Yang’s successor, Jin Shuren was neither as politically nor as economically savvy 
as Yang.  His minority policies and incompetent handling of Xinjiang’s economy isolated 
him across the ethnic spectrum.  Jin’s policies toward Muslims included “tax on livestock 
butchering, prohibition of the hajj, and replacement of local officials with Han 
officials.”60  His economic policies led to rampant inflation as he printed currency 
without restraint, levied unpopular taxes on the general population, and embezzled 
money from government run monopolies to increase his own personal wealth.61  Jin’s 
gravest mistake in ethnic relations came with the disbanding of the Kumul (also called 
Hami) Khanate,62 the fallout of which will be discussed in the following section.  Jin’s 
ineptitude led to not only rebellion of the Muslim minorities, but a coup by his own Han 
officers with the support of White Russians on April 12, 1933.63  After Jin fled to China 
proper via the Soviet Union, the rebellion that began because of his misrule led to the 
establishment of the first Eastern Turkistan Republic (ETR) in 1933.64  This government 
existence was short-lived when Sheng Shicai, Jin’s military commander, recaptured those 
areas controlled by the ETR with the aid of the Soviet Union.65  He then consolidated his 
control of the province. 
After the Soviet Union assisted him in quelling the rebellion, Sheng’s tenure was 
dominated by both political and economic interaction with the Soviet Union.  Sheng’s 
association with the Soviets had practical roots.  The Soviet Union’s proximity to 
Xinjiang being in closer than that of China proper, trade naturally favored the Soviet 
 
58 Millward and Tursun, 70. 
59 Ibid., 71; Forbes, 33-36. 
60 Millward and Tursun, 71. 
61 Forbes, 40-41. 
62 Ibid., 48-51. 
63 Millward and Tursun, 71. 
64 Ibid., 73-78. 
65 Ibid., 78. 
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Union.  In addition to Xinjiang crops, wool, and grain; Xinjiang also held valuable 
mineral and petroleum resources needed by the Soviet Union.66  This allowed Sheng the 
assurance of Soviet aid against any uprising since the Xinjiang trade held great 
importance to the Soviets.  Sheng had no fear of reprisal or opposition from the GMD 
given other concerns of the time such as the war against the Japanese.   
Sheng’s miscalculation of political currents ultimately led to the demise of his 
rule.  After Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, Sheng turned his loyalty from 
the Soviets to the Nationalists, becoming chairman of GMD party branch, “cut of Soviet 
trade [and] kicked out Soviet personnel.”67  The GMD government headed by Sheng 
Shicai now had problems.  The loss of the Soviet Union as a trading partner had a severe 
negative impact on Xinjiang’s economy.  GMD fiscal policies to counteract the economic 
crisis, from minting excess Xinjiang currency to replacing it with the Nationalist Chinese 
dollar, only exacerbated the economic situation. 68   Neither of these plans benefited 
Xinjiang or its minorities.  The only people who benefited from it were Han Chinese 
merchants and officials.69  Sheng, however, attempted reconciliation with the Soviet 
Union when it became clear that Germany would not defeat the Soviets by purging 
nationalist advisors and appealing to Stalin.  Stalin refused his overtures.  Sheng had now 
lost favor of Chang Kai-shek as well.  With the economic and political situation 
deteriorating Sheng was removed by the GMD in late summer 1944.   
The GMD plan for Xinjiang also included increased Han colonization, 
replacement of Turkic officials with Han at all administration levels, and “enormous tax 
increases to pay for a standing army of 100,000.”70   Xinjiang again devolved into 
rebellion in late 1944.  What is known as the “Ili Rebellion” began near the city of 
Yining.  This rebellion included ethnic minorities within Xinjiang as well as exiles 
repatriated by the Soviet Union.  The GMD and the rebels finally agreed to a coalition 
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government ruled in the south and east by the GMD and in the north by the ETR, whose 
close relationship with the Soviet Union remained strong until the Communist took 
power in late 1949.   
D.  MOTIVE, MEANS, AND OPPORTUNITY DURING THE REPUBLICAN 
ERA 
Although in the discussion of means motive and opportunity during the Qing era, 
opportunity was discussed last, during the Nationalist Era, opportunity should be 
considered first.  Simply put, opportunity for political violence remained present 
throughout the Nationalist Era due to the combination of weak central and provincial 
government and external influence in the region.  During the first few years of the 
Nationalist government, Xinjiang was a part of China in name only.  It was ruled by 
autocratic individuals whose only hold on power came from their personal militia’s 
loyalty and their manipulation of the cultural differences of Xinjiang’s ethnic minorities.  
Yang Zengxin adeptly manipulated control over opportunity through tight control of the 
information from the outside world while allowing the Muslim population to adhere to 
their traditional ways without overburdening them with taxation and immigration.71  His 
successor, however, although attempting to maintain tight control of information, both 
overtaxed the people and shattered the economy,72 thereby enabling opportunity and 
motive to juxtapose with means, which will be further discussed below.  The third and 
final autocrat would shift back to a more pluralistic approach, albeit ruthless, after 
regaining control with the help of the Soviet Union.  Once support from the Soviets 
disappeared rebellion once again occurred.73  With the government weak and external 
influence constantly present in the region, those moments where opportunity cohabitated 
with motive and means, a general uprising occurred. 
Although Yang Zengxin’s regime was fairly stable, it was extremely unpopular in 
both Han and minority circles.  Yang used divisive tactics and censorship to prevent any 
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uprising against him.  This was not solely limited to the minority element within 
Xinjiang, as seen by the inclusion of a ban on imported publications from both China and 
Central Asia.74  He, in fact, severely repressed any form of written media that promoted 
individual thinking or the spread of revolutionary movements such as pan-Turkic 
nationalism, Communism, or the Islamic educational movement.  Reformed minded 
individuals were often targeted by Yang to prevent collective thinking that may threaten 
his government. 75  However, although the repressive nature of the regime gave rise to 
motive for removal of Yang from power, his tactics of control were directed toward the 
entire population, therefore relative deprivation between Muslims and Han amounted to 
nothing.  The Muslim population had no motivation to rebel under any ethnic grievance 
model, per se, because their lives were no worse than their Han neighbors.   
Yang’s government weathered the economic downturn created by the loss of trade 
due to the Bolshevik revolution in the late 1910’s through tight political control and 
minimal taxation policy.  Because the financial burden on the Muslim community was no 
more than that on the Han population their economic deprivation was no more than that 
of Chinese either.  Trade with the newly formed Soviet Union slowly improved during 
the early 1920’s and in this vein; Muslim’s lives again were not in any way deprived 
economically compared to the Han population.  Those things changed under Yang’s 
successor. 
Jin Shuren’s general misrule created relative deprivation for Xinjiang’s Muslims 
on multiple levels as well as bringing greed into the mix.  Jin’s unchecked printing of 
currency produced massive inflation.76  Jin nearly doubled land taxes and established 
monopolies under government auspices in several sectors of business, such as the wool 
and pelt trade.77  These policies created extreme relative deprivation compared to the 
previous regime, particularly when taxes on livestock butchering and prohibition of the  
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hajj were added to the list.  Jin did not only create a situation where Muslim’s day-to-day 
living was worse than before, he also made it worse compared to the Han population’s 
lives as well through one ill conceived plan.   
Yang Zengxin had allowed the Kumul Khanate to maintain its autonomous status 
in line with Qing precedent.  Jin continued the policy until Khan Maqsud Shah died then 
dissolved the Khanate, installed Han officials and implemented Han immigration into the 
region.  These immigrants were allowed a two year tax exemption on the land on which 
they settled.  Jin further aggravated the situation by removing local Muslim’s from their 
land and giving it to some Han immigrants, who were given a three year tax exemption 
on their land.  Finally, adding insult to injury, Jin required the Muslims that were 
transplanted to pay land taxes on the basis of their old holdings.  Jin’s removal of the 
local autonomous rule and installation of Han officials angered Hami Muslims.  These 
changes in policy affected ethnic, religious, and economic deprivation when compared to 
their previous lives under Yang, but also meant that, compared to the adjacent Han 
population, they were extremely deprived.  This increased motive within the Hami 
Muslim community against Chinese rule enormously.  These policies fueled the Muslim 
motive for rebellion.78
The means had begun to accumulate almost immediately following Jin’s 
assumption of power, while the opportunity for rebellion under Jin Shuren came from an 
incident that occurred after of the appointment of Han officials in the former Hami 
Khanate.  As mentioned before, increased taxation provided general motive while 
abolishment of the Hami Khanate fueled the fire.  Another result from the Hami policy 
was the uniting of that region’s people in protest to the new land and tax policies after 
increased Han immigration.  Men of the region banded together and sent a telegram to Jin 
Shuren “exposing their grievances [which] was signed by men of every class among the 
Moslems.”79  This unification of Muslims in opposition to the government provided 
manpower to the element of means for the opposition.  When no reply came from Jin 
Shuren preparations for rebellion began and logistical support was added to the element 
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of means as supplies began to make their way to staging areas within the mountains.80  
The element of leadership, although present, can only be speculated with regard to who 
took the lead; although in the former Hami khanate it would likely have been Yulbars 
Khan and Khoja Niyas Hajji, who emerged as co-leaders of the Muslim insurgents.81  
With these key elements in place the only thing left was for opportunity to become 
juxtaposed with motive and means, which came earlier than expected in the form of an 
ethnic slight. 
Several different versions of the incident followed, but all follow this basic story.  
A young Han official in early 1931 become infatuated with a local Muslim (Uyghur) girl 
and wanted to marry her.82  The insult sparked a local uprising which quickly spread and 
was joined by other Turkic Muslims (Kazaks and Kyrgyz), as well as Tungans (Muslim 
Chinese).83  From that point the rebellion expanded and the entire province was in open 
rebellion during 1932-1933.84   
When Jin fled the capital of Urumchi, Jin’s military commander Sheng Shicai 
became the provincial ruler and after quelling the province.  Sheng, with the help of the 
Soviet Union slowly regained control of Xinjiang, and began ruling Xinjiang with an iron 
fist, but with improved economic policies.  In addition to improved fiscal policies Sheng 
also improved communications and agricultural infrastructure, building schools, medical 
facilities, and roads.85  His cultural policy subscribed to the minority policies of the 
Soviet Union, categorizing the minority ethnicities in Xinjiang into fourteen categories.  
This ethnic labeling can be considered the origin of the today’s Uyghur ethnicity.86  This 
policy promoted literacy among the various ethnicities; assigned government posts for 
the minorities based on ethnicity; and promoted literacy in the various languages, to 
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include “publication in various Turkic languages.”87  His fiscal policies and ethnic 
policies lessened motive to a manageable level, and with the help of the Soviets, means 
for the Muslims to rebel against Sheng were no longer available.   
Motive would still remain, however.  Sheng was by no means a benevolent ruler 
and he also subscribed to Stalin’s use of purges against internal political opposition, to 
include minorities, which only served to increase motive.88  When Stalin’s Great Purge 
descended over central Asia, Sheng carried out his own in Xinjiang.89  Estimates of 
prisoners executed under Sheng range from 50,000 to 100,000.90  Therefore, when Sheng 
passed from the scene and the GMD assumed full control of Xinjiang in 1944, the 
province had returned to a position where motive was high and opportunity was 
knocking.  All that was needed was means, which the Soviet Union provided handily.91  
With motive, means, and opportunity aligned once more, rebellion again erupted.  The 
result was the establishment of the East Turkistan Republic (ETR), which battled GMD 
forces for control until an armistice was established in 1946 with Soviet participation in 
the negotiations.92   
E.  CONCLUSION 
As previously stated, Xinjiang’s political environment throughout the nationalist 
era remained one where opportunity for rebellion constantly overshadowed the region 
and motive constantly hovered just below the surface.  Only proper manipulation of the 
environment kept motive and opportunity from overlapping with means.  In those cases 
where all three did overlap, rebellion typically occurred.  The Soviet Union’s influence in 
the region grew in the 1930’s and their involvement in Xinjiang predicated the final 
rebellion before the Chinese Communists assumed control of the province in late 1949.  
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Soviet influence did not end there, but Chinese Communist influence began.  The 
reaction of the Uyghurs to their new central government will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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IV. UNDER THE COMMUNISTS: FROM MAO TO THE 
MILLENNIA 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the Chinese government’s minority 
policies in Xinjiang since the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) victory in the Chinese 
Civil War.  This will be divided into two parts, each including a brief historical overview 
of Xinjiang during that particular period of Communist rule followed by an evaluation of 
these policies impact on the motive, means, and opportunity for large-scale political 
violence against the state.  The first part will cover the period from the establishment of 
the PRC in1949 until Mao Zedong’s death in 1976.  The second part will cover the period 
known as the Reform era from the rise of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s through 
present day.  This discussion is designed to evaluate the recent history of the Chinese 
state’s relations with Xinjiang’s minorities to determine existing factors in present day 
Xinjiang that will impact Xinjiang’s potential for large scale organized political violence.   
A. OVERVIEW OF MAO ERA 
The establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on Oct 1, 1949 
completely changed the face of China.  In Xinjiang, though, the PRC also represented the 
possibility of self-determination.93  The CCP fostered this hope and designed initial 
policies to avoid disharmony and upheaval during the transition to socialism.  In the end, 
however, Xinjiang suffered relatively the same turbulent times of ideological discord 
under Mao as the rest of China.  All of China, including Xinjiang, underwent a series of 
government policies that shifted from moderate to radical and back, which undermined 
social, political and economic structure of the state.  These policy changes affected 
Xinjiang differently than other areas of China due to both Xinjiang’s history of rebellion 
and its ethnic demographic composition. 
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Early policies in Xinjiang were moderate, based on the need for stability, but the 
party still instituted land reform and collectivization.  The CCP leadership recognized 
that ethnic unrest remained a very real threat and avoided drastic changes in the daily 
lives of the local minorities, instead opting for a long-term slow transition to socialism.94  
Muslim collectives were organized according to clans and land was given to each 
collective.  Traditional leadership according to ethnic group’s customs maintained 
stability.95  The distribution of land from wealthy landowners to the farmers who worked 
the land met with some approval and land reform and collectivization met with little 
resistance in the agricultural sector.96  The party did not target the pastoral sector for 
collectivization initially.  Nomadic Kazakhs under the leadership of Osman Batur 
continued to resist CCP occupation, and since their traditional means of production did 
not rely on land, per se, but rather livestock, the Party opted to proceed slowly.97  
Recruitment of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities into the CCP became an important 
concern for party leaders.98  Former pro-Soviet leaders of the ETR were retained in 
positions of leadership within the Xinjiang government. 99  These actions enabled the 
CCP to gain legitimacy in Xinjiang while simultaneously consolidating its power in the 
area.   
Beginning in the early 1950s, Beijing began establishing autonomous areas within 
ethnic minority dominated regions, finally establishing the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region in 1955.  The system began at the county level, slowly moving through the 
prefecture level and ultimately the provincial level.  These “autonomous” areas were 
based on the largest ethnic population in the particular government level that was being 
made “autonomous.”  This unique distribution complicated the region’s self-governance 
when “autonomous” counties designated for one minority fell under a higher level 
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designated for a different minority. 100  Thus in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
there are Kazak Autonomous Prefectures as well as Kyrgyz Autonomous Counties.  This 
division of autonomy on both a horizontal and vertical scale worked well for the CCP in 
keeping minorities from uniting, particularly when a concrete definition of autonomy 
never emerged, but rather the leadership was co-opted into the Party and assumed low-
level positions of authority.101
Until the latter half of the 1950s government policies regarding minority language 
and religion were fairly relaxed.102  The CCP allowed minority children to be taught in 
their native language and allowed for the use of minority cadres’ native language in the 
government as well.  Land reform and collectivization did not negatively impact minority 
language either since collectives were ethnicity based and traditional clan structure.103  
Land reform and collectivization did take away the revenue base of Islam as land 
revenues were shifted from the religious infrastructure to the Chinese government.  While 
this weakened the power of traditional religious leaders, the religious base merely shifted 
to decentralized Sufi sects and the party did not place restrictions on its practice as it 
represented no major threat.104  These branches of Islam did not compete with the 
government for land or land revenue, instead operating off donations.105  This enabled 
the CCP to expand its power without dismantling the religious structure.   
In the latter half of the 1950s, several policy shifts occurred in Xinjiang.  In 1956, 
the same year that Chairman Mao initiated the “Hundred Flowers Campaign” to allow 
public criticism of the Party, language reform began in Xinjiang.  Language reform 
nominally served to eliminate illiteracy, enabling minorities “to learn modern science 
more effectively” by modifying the script in which they were written.106  This new script 
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was to be based on the Cyrillic script used by the Soviet Union.  The reform also had a 
secondary goal to “erode the old Muslim religious teachings written in Arabic” because 
of the incompatibility of socialism and religion.107   
Public criticism of the Party during the “Hundred Flowers Movement” did not 
occur in Xinjiang until late 1956, when complaints about the autonomy structure and Han 
chauvinism made its way into the media.108  Although Xinjiang’s administrative organs 
retained a comparatively high percentage of non-Han and non-Party elements, there was 
never any question as to their continued subordination to the CCP.109  The Party was 
dominated by Han elements drawn primarily from the PLA 1st Field Artillery.  Previous 
pro-Soviet ETR officials were brought into the CCP and some gained high positions 
within the Xinjiang CCP hierarchy.  However, “in nearly all cases where a minority 
national was chosen to be a chairman, a Han national from the CCP-1st Field Artillery 
group was chosen as vice-chairman and more often than not exercised de facto 
authority.”110  There remained no doubt as to who held the power in Xinjiang.  
Commentary that Xinjiang would be better as a republic under the Soviet Union or as an 
independent state in its own right came to the forefront.111   
Complaints derived from such issues as the dissatisfaction of the autonomy 
structure in which true autonomy did not exist to Han cadres’ refusal to learn minority 
languages.  These types of complaints were labeled as “local nationalist” sentiments and 
led to the purging and dismissal of numerous minorities during the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign that followed.  “During the anti-rightist campaign of 1957-58…a number of 
minority nationals belonging to the CCP who held government position were either 
demoted or purged as…local nationalists and anti-Party elements.”112  These series of 
purges severely reduced the number of ethnic minorities in the Party’s ranks in Xinjiang.   
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Immediately following the Anti-Rightist Campaign the Great Leap Forward 
(GLF) began.  While the PRC moved toward rapid industrialization, the conditions in 
Xinjiang began to change as well.  In Xinjiang, where collectivization had been slow due 
to Party fears of ethnic tensions becoming ethnic rebellion if socialism were forced on 
minorities too fast, the Party decided to step up the speed of collectivization.113  
However, the attempt to industrialize rapidly using communes to produce both 
agricultural as well as industrial products did not fair well in Xinjiang.114  As elsewhere 
in the Chinese interior, the labor force being used to produce industrial products took 
away from the labor force used to produce agricultural products.  The subsequent 
starvation that ensued from the under reporting of crops occurred on a dramatic scale in 
Xinjiang as well.  An influx of several thousands of people from the interior also fled to 
Xinjiang in search of food.115   
The internal political situation of Xinjiang also grew worse as tensions between 
the Soviet Union and the PRC increased.  The fracturing of relations with the Soviet 
Union, due the non-standard model that Mao chose to follow, negatively impacted 
government-minority relations.  Minority cadres were accused of pro-Soviet sympathies 
and local nationalism.116  Those minority cadres who were suspected of pro-Soviet 
sympathies and those who were formerly pro-Soviet cadres of the ETR were purged.117  
As the GLF progressed, Sino-Soviet relations continued to deteriorate.  Xinjiang’s ethnic 
minorities who saw their kinsmen’s lives under the Soviet Union as being better began an 
exodus from Xinjiang.118  Mutual antagonism with the Soviet Union increased and as 
McMillan describes it: 
Numerous border clashes between the two former allies were reported and unrest 
among the region’s minority nationalities intensified.  In 1962 hostilities broke out in the 
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Yili area as well as along the Sino-Indian border.  This prompted Peking to seal off the 
Sino-Soviet border in western Xinjiang and build up PLA strength there.119  Prior to this 
sealing of the border though, some 60,000-70,000 Kazaks, Uyghurs, and other minorities 
fled to the Soviet Union partly in response so Soviet propaganda.120
After the failure of the GLF, the Sino-Soviet split, and the self-imposed 
withdrawal of Mao from active leadership of the Party, government policies in Xinjiang 
aimed at maintaining stability through unity.121  Minority policies liberalized in as much 
as “local peoples were to be allowed to use their written and spoken languages and that 
their local customs were to be respected.”122  Nevertheless, a new round of language 
reform occurred with the same end goal for the removal of Islam’s influence on 
Xinjiang’s minorities, but additionally to reduce the Soviet influence by changing to a 
Latin alphabet based script.123  This period saw little economic growth as the region’s 
major trading partner, the Soviet Union, now became an adversary.  Inasmuch as the 
period was tense, it would only become tenser once the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution began. 
The Cultural Revolution created discord throughout China.  Ironically, in 
Xinjiang the focus of conflict was between the local Han leadership and Beijing.  The 
purges and conflict were between radical Red Guards from interior China who were sent 
to Xinjiang by the Beijing leadership and Xinjiang Red Guards supported by local PLA 
units and Xinjiang CCP elements.124  These elements adhered to Mao’s policy of wiping 
out the “four olds,” and as a result, Cultural Revolution activities frequently resulted in 
abuses of minorities under the guise of removing local nationalist separatists. 125   These 
abuses ranged from the penning of pigs in mosques, an affront on Muslim culture, to the 
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defacing of minority cultural works of art, to public beatings of minorities.126  These 
activities occurred throughout the remainder of the Cultural Revolution and finally 
subsided with the death of Mao Zedong and the arrest of the “Gang of Four.” 
Throughout the Mao era ideological shifts in policy influenced the government’s 
reaction to its minority population.  In Xinjiang these policies impacted more than social, 
economic, and political status.  These policies affected language, religion, and traditional 
cultural hierarchy.  With this additional impact on the lives of Xinjiang’s minorities, the 
policy shift’s effect on motive, means, and opportunity were great.  Yet major armed 
political violence did not occur during the period.  The reasons for this lie in the 
juxtaposition of differing levels of motive, means, and opportunity, as discussed in the 
following section. 
B. MOTIVE, MEANS, AND OPPORTUNITY DURING THE MAO ERA 
In 1949 when the Chinese Communist Party gained control of Xinjiang, 
opposition to Chinese rule remained present.  The ETR still retained control of the 
northwestern part of Xinjiang and Kazakhs led by Osman Batur continued to resist the 
Chinese.127  The only common thread that most Muslim Turkic ethnic groups had in 
common with the Chinese Communists was mutual opposition to the Nationalists.  With 
the help of Soviet influence, the CCP was able to absorb the ETR government into the 
newly established Peoples Republic of China, enabling the CCP to begin its social and 
economic programs of land reform and collectivization.128  Motive, means, and 
opportunity for large-scale organized political violence during the initial stages of CCP 
rule were relatively low in Xinjiang, despite anti-Han sentiment. 
Although motivation of some members within the leadership of the ETR for 
independent rule was likely high, other members did not oppose being absorbed into a 
Communist China.  Some sources purport that the first delegation to Beijing to meet with 
 
126 Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 274-276. 
127 Millward and Tursun, 88; Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 237-238. 
128 Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 233-234. 
 42
                                                
Mao Zedong and the CCP leadership, planned to demand independence for Xinjiang.129  
However the delegation that attended eventually attended the meeting, made no such 
demands.  The motive for major armed conflict within the general population was likely 
not very high either.  For the average person in Xinjiang their situation relative to the 
preceding decade was much improved.  World War II had ended and the Soviet Union, 
who Sheng Shicai had kicked out of Xinjiang, had returned and brought with it economic 
benefits.  Land reform under the Chinese Communists meant that poor peasants now 
shared land of their own.  Even the CCP offered opportunity as it launched a major 
campaign to recruit ethnic minorities, even accepting members of the former ETR into its 
ranks.  Major armed political violence against the Chinese government would not create a 
situation better than the current one for the average person, thus keeping the level of 
motive marginally low.  Additionally, initial CCP policies toward minority language and 
religion were relatively relaxed in that no major changes to the language structure and use 
were made and Muslims were able to practice their religion as they chose.  As such no 
intrinsic motive based on psychological or emotional needs existed.   
Opportunity and internal means for major political violence, however, was 
initially high at the start of CCP rule.  Although the Chinese Red Army occupied 
Xinjiang; and although some of Xinjiang’s ethnic minority leaders supported Communist 
rule, local leaders opposed Chinese rule could have recruited people to aid in fighting 
against the communists since the CCP had not yet assumed full political control of the 
province.  Kazakhs in nomadic areas continued to resist CCP occupation and could have 
been co-opted to assist in large-scale organized rebellion.  With the new government just 
beginning to govern China, its ability to simultaneously quell a large-scale rebellion in 
Xinjiang while maintaining a defensive posture against the Nationalists may have been 
too much for the fledgling government.130  Two reasons combined to prevent major 
organized political violence though opportunity and internal means were high.  First, the 
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overall level of motive for large-scale political violence was low given the relative 
prosperity of Xinjiang’s inhabitants compared to the previous decade.  Second, while the 
resources for means could be derived from internal sources, external sources critical to 
the success of mass political violence could not be found.   
At the outset of the Mao Era, the ethnic minority population of Xinjiang no longer 
had the external means to conduct major political violence.  The Soviet Union, who had 
been a benefactor for Xinjiang’s rebellions a decade earlier, decided to support and to 
foster the newly established Communist government in China.131  The Soviet Union had 
supported the establishment of the ETR for two reasons: first because the ETR had 
maintained strong ties with the Soviets both economically and politically; and second 
because the ETR had opposed the Nationalist regime that had been exerting its influence 
in Xinjiang after the ouster of Sheng Shicai to the detriment of Soviet interests.132  With 
the Nationalists gone from the mainland, the Soviets could operate within Xinjiang not 
only without opposition from the new Chinese Communist government but also at its 
request.  Consequently, while the Soviet Union had willingly provided the means for 
rebellion against the Nationalist government, they were disinclined to provide such 
means against the Communist government.  Without such means, the minority population 
within Xinjiang had no external means for mass organized political violence.  This 
combined with the low level of motive rendered the internal means and opportunity for 
major rebellion impotent. 
For the first half of the decade following the Communist takeover of China and 
Xinjiang, the dynamics of motive, means and opportunity changed little.  The level of 
internal means and opportunity lowered as the CCP recruited more and more ethnic 
minorities into the party and solidified its political control of the province.  External 
means also remained low as the Soviet Union and the PRC maintained cordial relations.  
The level of motive remained low as the party continued the process of collectivization 
because only those minorities whose means of production were agricultural were moved 
into collectives, while those whose means were pastoral were left to their traditional 
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ways.  Additionally, those who were moved into collectives were allowed to maintain 
their traditional social structure.  Thus Xinjiang’s minorities suffered no relative 
deprivation compared to their previous quality of life, social status, or economic position.  
Their confidence in the Party, while possibly skeptical due to its Han dominance, also 
had not been lost.   
However, at this juncture Mao Zedong launched the Hundred Flower’s Campaign 
with the Anti-Rightist Campaign following on its heels.  As with the rest of China, the 
discontent and dissatisfaction expressed by the masses were not well received by 
Chairman Mao.  The calls for an independent Xinjiang or a Soviet republic led to mass 
purging of minority cadres.  These purges and the overall crackdown on minorities that 
accompanied them created conditions worse than before, thus relative deprivation, and 
heightened opposition to Chinese rule and a loss of confidence and trust in the Party.133  
From these events the level of motive for political violence as a response likely rose, 
however, with the CCP in firm political as well as military control, opportunity remained 
low.  Means, both internal and external, remained low as well due to the loss of ethnic 
leadership during the purges and the Soviet Union’s continued fraternal position to the 
PRC.134   
After the Sino-Soviet split, the dynamics for means reduced even more.  The 
Soviet Union began to promote anti-Chinese propaganda and offered better conditions 
and greater autonomy within Soviet borders. 135  The opportunity to leave China provided 
an alternative to Chinese rule, while avoiding the possible costs associated with political 
violence.  As tensions heightened, hostilities broke out, and the mass exodus of 1962 
from Xinjiang to the Soviet Union occurred, the militarization of the border shut off the 
external means of support from the Soviet Union, reducing overall means to a low level.  
Without Soviet support, Xinjiang’s minorities had no means available for any type of  
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large-scale political violence.  The Chinese government had also strengthened its political 
control of Xinjiang through its purge of minority cadres, leaving the level of opportunity 
low as well. 
C. OVERVIEW OF REFORM ERA 
After Mao’s death the dawn of the Reform Era changed Xinjiang’s situation.  
Deng Xiaoping’s reform policies opened China to the world and Xinjiang to a degree as 
well.  Economic reform in Xinjiang did not have the same facets as on the eastern 
seaboard, such as foreign direct investment and state-owned-enterprises becoming private 
ventures, but even the opening of trade to the outside world influenced certain social 
aspects of Xinjiang.  Trade between the Soviet Union and Xinjiang remained virtually 
non-existent, yet trade between Xinjiang and its southwest neighbors, particularly 
Pakistan, improved.136  The border between Xinjiang and Pakistan was opened, 
increasing trade and reintroducing Islam into the region as Pakistani traders in addition to 
bringing their wares into Xinjiang “often saw it as their duty to provide information about 
Islam to local Muslim peoples.”137  This reintroduction of Islam into Uyghur society 
sparked great interest and hope, particularly among older Uyghurs, of a return to 
traditional Islamic values to a region where government control had altered them.138   
Economic reform and social liberalization led to the expansion of certain rights to 
Uyghurs and other minorities as the Chinese government loosened its restrictions on such 
activities as clothing, language, literature, and worship.  As redress for the destruction of 
mosques during the Cultural Revolution, the government began constructing or 
rebuilding large numbers of mosques for Muslims in Xinjiang during the 1980’s.  
Chinese authorities also began to allow Uyghurs to conduct the Hajj to Mecca with 
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certain restrictions, such as being sponsored by Pakistani Nationals.139 In addition, the 
government became more tolerant of Islamic education, allowing imams (religious 
educators) to take on talips (religious students) and Islamic schools to operate.  Chinese 
reform and open door policy brought mixed benefits as “Uyghurs also enrolled in 
Pakistani schools and universities and some even traveled as far as Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt for their education.”140  Yet while the government “permitted many students to go 
abroad, [they] sometimes would not let them return to China for fear of their spreading 
Islamic ideologies and igniting separatist sentiments.”141   
The Chinese government also allowed Uyghur language to reemerge in its Arabic 
script.142  Restrictions on the use of Chinese only in educational institutions relaxed also, 
predominantly at the primary school level.  Chinese was to be taught at the higher levels 
of primary education, but the government “encouraged the use of texts and oral 
instruction in the minority languages as well.”143  Educational institutions improved as a 
whole in Xinjiang during this period and political participation by minorities in local 
government increased as those party cadres purged during the Cultural Revolution were 
reinstated.144  Han cadres were transferred from Xinjiang to other areas, opening the way 
for some measure of political autonomy as minority cadres assumed government 
positions.145  From these positions minority leaders pushed for more rights for their 
people through traditional religious education and the lifting of family planning 
restrictions on Xinjiang Muslims.  During the 1980s the Chinese state turned a blind eye 
to these activities as the economic benefits of reform continued.  
Following the Tiananmen Square Incident in June 1989, Xinjiang felt the 
tightening of the CCP control along with the rest of China.  In Xinjiang the policy shift 
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focused itself on those things that had been opened up to minorities again during the 
1980s, primarily religion.  In the aftermath of Tiananmen the Chinese government 
imposed several constraints on the practice of Islam in Xinjiang.  State regulations 
prohibited attendance of mosques by persons not eighteen or older.146  Construction of 
new mosques throughout Xinjiang was halted and some mosques were destroyed during 
the 1990s for a variety of reasons from being used as meeting places for separatist’s 
conspirators to having been built without government approval.147  Certain Islamic social 
and educational activities, such as the Uyghur Masrah, a social organization for young 
Uyghur men, and private Koranic instruction became labeled as illegal religious 
activities.148
This clampdown on this civil society during the 1990s became more pronounced 
in 1996 as the Chinese government began its “Strike Hard” campaign to root out 
secessionists and separatists.  The Chinese government focused on what it considered 
illegal religious activity, which it claimed fuelled separatists sentiments.149  The 
campaign led to thousand of arrests and rapid punishment.  Reaction to the government’s 
crackdown varied in degree, ranging from student protests to full-blown riots to a series 
of bus bombings in Urumchi on the day of Deng Xiaoping’s memorial.150  The result was 
civil society moving underground as the cycle of government repression and Uyghur 
response continued throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s.   
From the beginning of the reform era Xinjiang’s Uyghurs and other minorities 
had been able to receive an education in their own language.  Beginning in the early 
2000s the government modified this policy in order to “increase levels of Chinese fluency 
and literacy for all students.”151  The government’s stated goal of these changes was to 
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create a bilingual education system whereby elementary through secondary education 
would be taught in a bilingual setting.  Such change would arguably help minorities 
obtain better careers with higher salaries.   In some circles it has been viewed as a way to 
stamp out Uyghur language, while in others it has been viewed as a way of integrating 
Uyghurs and other minorities in to mainstream Chinese society.152
Notwithstanding the rise in ethnic tensions, Xinjiang underwent incredible 
transformation during the 1990s and early 2000s.  While the warming of relations with 
the Soviet Union had resulted in the opening of five cities to border trade, the collapse of 
the Soviet Union created an economic opportunity.  Central Asian states whose Soviet 
orientation had leaned toward Moscow now looked toward the east and Xinjiang.  This 
increase of trade with China and the Central Asian states provided opportunities for 
Uyghur entrepreneurs such as businesswoman Rebiya Kadir, who used this opportunity 
to expand on her business ventures already operating in Xinjiang.  Xinjiang also became 
the target of foreign investment, as companies scurried to secure footholds in the oil and 
natural gas fields in Xinjiang that have yet to be tapped.   
Beijing also began investing in the development of Xinjiang’s infrastructure.  
From the Sino-Soviet split until the collapse of the Soviet Union, Beijing had no reason 
to develop Xinjiang’s infrastructure.  Trade with the Soviet Union was non-existent, so 
infrastructure was not needed for transport of products between the two.  Additionally, 
such infrastructure could be exploited by the Soviet Union to reach interior China in the 
event of war, which Beijing definitely did not want.  However, this infrastructure, which 
includes highways, railways, and airports, could now serve as a means of increasing 
tourism and trade by providing rapid, easy access to Xinjiang’s cities and towns.  It also 
provided a means for connecting Xinjiang's and China’s markets to Central Asia, Russia 
and Europe, as seen in the building of an oil pipeline built between Kazakhstan’s oilfields 
and Xinjiang that began operating in May 2006.  Xinjiang is finally reaping the promised 
benefits of the Reform Era. 
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D. MOTIVE, MEANS, AND OPPORTUNITY DURING THE REFORM ERA 
During the 1980s motive, opportunity, and means were all relatively low.  
Improved living conditions, both economically and socially, gave Xinjiang’s minorities 
some personal, if not political, autonomy.  The opening of trade and its economic 
benefits, the increased number of educated minorities, and the resurgence of Islam due to 
relaxed government policies gave rise to civil society.  Business professionals, religious 
leaders and educators, as well as journalists began to assume leadership positions within 
society.  From these positions Uyghurs and other minorities began to address social ills.  
Because the Chinese government ignored such activities during this period, motive for 
political violence against the state became low.  Such organized rebellion would only 
reverse the trend of social and religious liberalization bringing no benefit to individuals 
or the group as a whole.  During the 1980s nothing was to be gained through mass 
political violence. However, religious influences were making their way into Xinjiang, 
and while radical forces had not yet gotten a foothold in the region, toward the end of the 
decade these influences had begun to take seed.  The rise of the Islamic state in Iran, 
coupled with the successful Afghani resistance of the Soviet Union provided some hope 
that Xinjiang might one day be able to gain its independence.   
External means during the period remained relatively low as well.  Relations with 
the Soviet Union did not thaw until the late-1980s.  With the border sealed, Xinjiang’s 
minorities had no contact with their Soviet kinsmen, much less the Soviet government, 
and therefore could not expect monetary, equipment, or personnel support from their 
former benefactor.  Internal means while present in the form of personnel remained 
lacking in equipment and funds.  With government minority policies relaxed, the 
minority leadership that would be the key to any uprising sought to use their influence 
within the government to make life better for their kinsmen.   
Opportunity also remained very low.  While the country had just emerged from 
the leadership transition period after a decade of political upheaval, the Chinese state was 
strong by most accounts.  It had no internal or external conflicts that would prevent it 
from bringing to bear the full force of its police and military in the event of an armed 
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rebellion.  Economically it was growing stronger and had gained international 
recognition.  The United States had reestablished diplomatic ties, thus reducing the threat 
of war with America.  Additionally, the Soviet Union was occupied in Afghanistan, thus 
reducing the Soviet threat of invasion.  The lack of conditions in which the government 
would be unable to contend with major political violence in Xinjiang would continue for 
the duration of the decade and only improve in the state’s favor as Sino-Soviet relations 
warmed during the 1980s. 
Several things came together to change the level of motive and means to a point 
where organized political violence began to appear a viable course of action by the mid-
1990s.  After Tiananmen and throughout the 1990s motive increased within Xinjiang 
enormously.  After almost a decade of expanded religious, educational, and economic 
improvement, the sudden loss of many of those privileges heightened discontent.  Anger 
over the loss of what was obtained and the loss of expectations of future rights and 
privileges clearly adheres to the aspirational form of relative deprivation.  Just as religion 
was once again becoming a fundamental part of ethnic identity, the Chinese government 
deprived the minority population of it, placing restrictions on its practice and banning 
social organizations associated with it.  Such restrictions deprived minors of being unable 
to attend local mosques and build relationships according to traditional Muslim values, 
thus hampering the instilment of the religious foundation of Islam in children.153  
The government’s repression of religious activities had the unintended effect of 
uniting the Uyghurs.  The result was civil society moving underground as the cycle of 
government repression and Uyghur response continued throughout the late 1990s and 
early 2000s.  The rise of religious and business leaders as positive role models in society 
with the capacity and willingness to confront social issues not addressed by the state had 
empowered civil society in Xinjiang.  These leaders could mobilize minorities, especially 
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for acting outside the state guided parameters surely created frustration, and as mentioned 
before, united Uyghurs in their opposition to the Chinese government, thereby increasing 
motive.   
Islamic social organizations began to operate underground due to government 
scrutiny. 154  The addressing of grievances against government policies, having no legal 
place to be aired, were aired in public protests, often inciting violent government 
responses and riotous outcomes.  The government still refused to address ethnic issues 
within Xinjiang even as the amount and strength of grievances rose.  Without a means to 
address relative deprivation within Xinjiang, the use of political violence to obtain both 
group and individuals goals likely began to be seen as acceptable in some circles.   
Means for major organized political violence increased drastically during the 
early to mid-1990s, particularly external means.  The beginning of the decade saw the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of Central Asian states with ethnic 
nationality names.  With this development came several important changes in perspective 
within Xinjiang.  With the newly created states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan the Uyghurs became the only remaining ethnic minority 
without its own state.  Calls for an independent “Uyghurstan” or another “East 
Turkestan” echoed through Xinjiang.155  Those minorities, particularly Uyghurs that had 
gone abroad to study and remained in foreign countries, began to become a political force 
within the international community, appealing to the United States, and other 
governments, as well as the United Nations to address the Uyghur plight in Xinjiang.156  
Uyghur Diaspora in the newly formed Central Asian states also began to provide support 
and safe haven to Uyghurs that sought to oppose the Chinese government.   
With motive and means rising, opportunity heightened as well.  The 
demilitarization of the former Soviet border and the increased traffic associated with 
trade and tourism as Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Tajiks, and Uzbeks, renewed contacts with their 
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Soviet kinsmen impacted opportunity, giving safe haven from which to strike and then to 
retreat.  The knowledge that Diaspora and states sympathetic to the plight of minorities in 
Xinjiang were right next door may have also emboldened Uyghurs to oppose the 
government.  However, it was the weakness of the states from which this support sprang 
that created the opportunity.  Even with the “Strike Hard” campaign in 1996 and its large 
number of arrests, political violence in Xinjiang increased during the following year.  
With political violence continuing through the end of the decade, the Chinese 
government finally made a move in 2001 that helped reduce opportunity by reducing 
means.  While the “Strike Hard” campaign continued in Xinjiang to counter internal 
means of political violence, Beijing began using diplomatic methods to counter external 
means.   
Beijing had initiated the formation of the "Shanghai Five," which changed its 
name to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization when Uzbekistan obtained membership 
in 2001, for the primary purpose of addressing border delineation and military 
disarmament in the border regions.157  After those issues had resolved themselves, the 
situation changed to reducing security threats in the form of terrorist groups, religious 
extremists, and ethnic separatists.158   Using financial aid China put pressure on SCO 
members to control their domestic support network for Uyghur dissidents, a move that 
reduced means and opportunity.  This tactic also helped spur economic improvement for 
SCO members, which in turn helped economic development in Xinjiang.  The trade 
volume between China and the five Central Asian states grew to 19.72 billion in 2003 159 
and hit $27 billion in 2004.160  Xinjiang accounted for more than 40 percent of the total 
trade between China and SCO members.  This trade significantly aided in the  
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development of Xinjiang as the government launched its “Develop the West” campaign 
to modernize Xinjiang’s infrastructure.  This combined with China’s internal investments 
brought economic benefits to Xinjiang.   
E. CONCLUSION  
The shifting policy situation in Xinjiang created discontent and discord for 
Xinjiang’s minority throughout the Communist Era.  Varying levels of motive means and 
opportunity occurred during the period, but these levels never simultaneously reached a 
level high enough to create conditions that led to mass organized political violence.  
While occasional violent incidents occurred and several incidents of organized protests 
occurred, particularly during the 1990s, no major movement arose within the seven 
million plus Uyghur population.  This is partly attributed to the role of the Soviet Union 
in the affairs of Xinjiang before the Sino-Soviet split and partly due to the strength of 
state of China itself through the remainder of the period, particularly after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union.   
China’s rise since it opening began in the early 1980s strengthened its domestic 
control through economic means while slowly opening the door to civil society.  Yet 
during the 1990s Beijing once again found itself with ethnic unrest in Xinjiang due to the 
cultural differences of its minority population.  Beijing’s ability to use political and 
economic influence to obtain assistance from adjacent states in controlling their Uyghur 
population during the first half of the 2000s and began to regain stability in Xinjiang.  
Since China’s economic maneuvering and opportunity and repressive tactics after 9/11, 
the Chinese state has slowly moved to more moderate policies while stepping up its 
development of Xinjiang.  Whether or not this will offset the collective memory of 
repression during the 1990s, thus reducing motive, is yet to be seen, as is the likelihood 
of means and opportunity remaining low.   
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V. FUTURE PROGNOSIS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Historically Xinjiang has been a difficult region for China to control.  Several 
factors contributed to this problem, including geography, ethnicity, religion, 
economic/trade orientation, and international politics.  While globalization and the 
formation of nation-states have mitigated some of these, they have also heightened the 
impact of others.  The level at which each of these impact motivation, means, and 
opportunity depends on the importance of each to the residents of the region.  In this 
context it is difficult to assess with absolute certainty the likelihood of mass organized 
political violence.  Only individuals know whether they will choose to participate in such 
activities, and even then they may not be absolutely certain.  The most difficult aspect to 
determine when evaluating such prospects therefore, is motivation.  While opportunity 
and means are more obvious to the observer, even they too are subject to interpretation.   
This makes the theoretical concepts of rational choice and relative deprivation 
solid starting points for determining the degree of motive.  Typically, an entire ethnic 
population will not be the subject of relative deprivation, and will likely not succumb to 
individual desires to resort to violent means to address grievances.  But grievances can be 
manipulated by those who believe that they will gain in some fashion if the ethnic 
population will mobilize behind their leadership.  Rational choice then becomes the 
determinant for the benefit to be obtained.  The benefit to be obtained can be assessed by 
evaluation of those things that one group, when comparing itself to another group, sees 
itself as relatively deprived.  In the case of Xinjiang’s minorities, comparisons of 
themselves to Han Chinese in political, economic, and cultural areas determine their 
perceptions of their position within Chinese society.  Comparisons of themselves to their 
kinsmen in the adjacent Central Asian republics determine their perceptions of religious 
and cultural freedoms, or the lack thereof, under Chinese rule.  Finally, comparisons of 
other ethnicities that have a “home” of their own in the form of Central Asian states 
determine Xinjiang’s Uyghurs perceptions that the Chinese government has kept them 
from a country of their own. 
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With that being said, an assessment can be made based on the manner in which 
the state’s policies affect its minorities' economic, social, and political positions within 
overall society.  The state’s responses to minority discontent most certainly will affect 
motive.  Their minority policies will also affect motive, but as will be discussed below, 
often times the state it in a no-win situation when handling certain aspects of those 
policies.  Interactions with neighboring nation-states and international institutions can 
affect external means, while its internal security decisions will impact internal means.  
The state’s strength and stability, plus its relations with regional neighbors have the 
greatest impact on opportunity.  Within this framework I will attempt to offer an answer 
to the question of whether or not likelihood of mass organized political violence in 
Xinjiang exists for the immediate future.  Obviously this includes a bit of guesswork, but 
as with any assessment of political events, no answer is perfect. 
A. MOTIVE 
When trying to reduce motive in Xinjiang the most problematic issue for the 
Chinese government is unintended consequences.  During the 1980s relaxed minority 
policies allowed religion, traditional leadership, and language to return to an important 
place in society.  Economic reform enabled individuals to accumulate wealth, thereby 
raising their social status and putting them in positions of leadership within a newly 
emerging civil society.  During the repressive years of the 1990s, this civil society went 
underground but leaders still influenced the minority population.  As the government 
targeted what it considered to be the cause of discontent, primarily religion and those 
organizations associated with religion, it inadvertently increased motive against it by 
attacking something ethnically significant, something that unites Xinjiang's minorities, 
and something whose intrinsic value cannot be calculated.   
Considering that the largest rebellion in Chinese history, the Taiping rebellion, 
was religiously based and that the Muslim rebellions that followed had religious 
dimension; it is understandable that the Chinese government fears the influence of 
religion.  However, an accommodation to religious practices would likely reduce the risk 
of those moderate Muslims sympathizing and supporting extremists of the faith.  
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Currently, the Chinese constitution grants two religious freedoms:  the right to believe 
and the right not to believe. Party members only have the right to the latter.  This creates 
a conflict in Muslim society as those minorities in government service either have to give 
up the party or give up the religious practices.  This dilemma results in cadres whose 
reputation within their ethnic community is less than positive or minority leaders that are 
unable to penetrate the party and properly represent their minority.  What is left is a lack 
of confidence in the government.   
The leadership left in the government now has not only little influence in the party 
sphere, but also little influence in the minority population.  Religious leaders, who 
returned to their some of their traditional leadership roles and were targeted during the 
1990s, likely have more credibility within Muslim society.  While it is hard to reconcile 
an atheist government to the acceptance of, much less the support for, religious 
leadership, such tolerance might be a critical piece to reducing motive within Uyghur 
society.  At the least, repression of religion and targeting of religious leaders will 
continue to have the unintended consequence of uniting Uyghurs and other minorities 
against the government.  Additionally it will continue to perpetuate the perception that 
relative to Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in the adjacent Central Asian states their 
situation is worse because they are being deprived of a central part of their ethnicity, their 
religion. 
The Chinese government recently been modified another ethnic area that it 
targeted in the past, minority languages.  However, this time the Chinese government’s 
policy change is not assimilationist, but rather integrationist.  When the Chinese 
government decided to allow for the use of Uyghur script in its traditional Arabic script 
in 1981, it also allowed for the use of Uyghur language in primary and secondary 
education, including the university level.  Minorities were not required to study Chinese 
until the university level.  This contrasted sharply with the policy of the 1960s and 1970s 
in which the practice of only teaching in Chinese, in both primary and secondary 




minorities who could not communicate with their own ethnic group.  In both cases a 
language barrier emerged that created problems within society and animosity directed at 
the government.   
The new policy attempts to avoid the problems created by previous policies by 
ensuring the use of both minority language and Chinese in the classroom.  The 
government’s decision to provide bilingual education during elementary and secondary 
education and to provide only Chinese instruction at the university level has met with 
resistance within some minority circles.  Yet, education in the Uyghur language only 
created a generation of Uyghurs who cannot function within Chinese society due to their 
inability to communicate with Han Chinese.  While some calls that it is an attempt to 
wipe out the Uyghur language have arisen, some Uyghurs realize the benefit of bilingual 
education.  This policy will likely lessen motive within Xinjiang as the benefits for 
Uyghurs who speak Chinese increase.  Arguably when compared to their kinsmen in the 
neighboring Central Asian states they are deprived of the use of their language in all 
levels of government and within in all segments of society.  However, they will have an 
advantage over those same people by virtue of their Chinese language ability in a world 
where China is a rising power. 
Xinjiang’s economic situation, which has been improving rapidly and can be 
expected to continue to do so in the foreseeable future, will help curb motive against 
major organized political violence.  The Chinese government sees economic benefits as 
the key to avoiding civil unrest.  While the income disparity has proven divisive in the 
eastern part of the country where the predominant ethnicity is Han, in Xinjiang the 
outcome might be otherwise.  While relative deprivation of Uyghurs compared to Han in 
economic realm currently puts the government in a negative light, as more Uyghurs, 
particularly those who will benefit from the language reform discussed above, gain 
higher positions and greater wealth from the development of the region, the perceived 
relative deprivation of Uyghurs will be reduced.  These Uyghurs also will no longer view 
themselves as relatively deprived compared to their Central Asian kinsmen whose 
economic fortunes also depend heavily on China and Xinjiang.   
 59
Based on these observations the level of motive in Xinjiang over the next several 
years will be hard to predict.  Economic growth and investment, along with increased 
trade with the Central Asian states will likely reduce relative deprivation on the economic 
scale, and thus motive, as individuals base their decisions for or against political violence 
on their quality of life.  However, repression of religious leaders and restrictions on the 
ability to practice Islam will continue to unite Xinjiang’s Turkic Muslims against the 
government, and create a situation where choices on the use of such methods are based 
on intrinsic factors.  Language reform could as in the past have the unintended 
consequences of uniting Uyghurs against the government if they feel their language and 
culture is being targeted for destruction.  If undertaken correctly though, the Chinese 
government could turn language reform into way to reduce motive by maintaining 
Uyghur culture and improving upward social mobility.  The final assessment though will 
have to be done in hindsight. 
B. MEANS 
Beijing has been far more successful reducing external means than reducing 
internal means when confronting what it sees as separatist activity in Xinjiang.  Beijing’s 
approach to reducing internal means for political violence in Xinjiang during the 1990s 
amounted to little more than repression and brutality.  While Beijing was able to arrest 
and incarcerate thousands of Uyghurs it considered to be separatists or sympathizers, the 
result was an increase in motive and the decision of many Uyghurs who would otherwise 
not participate in such activities to do so.  This led to a cycle of repression and response 
that benefited neither the state nor Xinjiang’s minorities.  This repression/response cycle 
received international attention and following the intervention of NATO in Kosovo to 
prevent the genocide of ethnic Muslims, hope swelled that the same might occur in 
Xinjiang.  The Chinese government slowly eased off from its “Strike Hard” campaign 
and began using the SCO as a mechanism for reducing external means, less repressive 
times returned, reducing motive and thus reducing internal means.  
Beijing has been far more successful reducing external means than reducing 
internal means.  China’s greatest success in addressing means has been its use of the 
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SCO.  The SCO charter calls for cooperation in the areas of political affairs, economy 
and trade, science and technology, culture, education, energy, and transportation, 
however in 2001 Through the SCO China has gained security cooperation from its 
Central Asian neighbors, reducing the threat of terrorism as a tool of political violence in 
Xinjiang.  The clamping down on dissident groups and their training camps within those 
states’ borders has limited the ability of Uyghur extremist to gain weapons and training.  
These neighboring governments have also moved to limit the activities of Uyghur 
Diaspora within their borders, thereby muting the voices of dissension that could aid in 
any major separatist movement.  China then used the SCO framework to increase its 
ability to control means by establishing a regional anti-terrorist structure was in Tashkent, 
Uzbekistan in 2004.161  In 2005 India, Iran, and Pakistan were given observer status in the 
SCO.  China’s support for the inclusion of Pakistan and Iran highlights the importance of 
those Muslim states’ influence on the affairs of Xinjiang.   
This cooperation did not come cheap, but the benefits were worth it to the 
Chinese government.  From Beijing’s perspective economic growth is the key to success 
in Xinjiang.  China decided to offer “a total of 900 million U. S. dollars of preferential 
buyer's credit loans to the other five members” of the SCO.162  China also decided to 
provide assistance and preferential loans to Uzbekistan, the specific sum of which was 
not revealed, but which was reported to be a 20-year preferential credit for a total sum of 
$350 million, [and] a $900-million credit.163  These loans not only orient SCO members 
to China, but a vast majority of these loans will be used to develop infrastructure to 
increase trade between them.  This serves to both strengthen relations between other SCO 
members and China, as well as help maintain those governments strength of state. 
Chinese investments in Central Asia helped ensure that governments will continue 
to rein in support for any separatist movement in Xinjiang.  Without monetary support, 
training support, and safe haven for Uyghur refugees, the external means available were 
 
161 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), available online at http://www.sectsco.org/html/00030.html. 
162 “China offers US $900 million in credit loans to SCO members,” People’s Daily Online, available at 
http://english.people.com.cn/200406/18/eng20040618_146720.html. 
163 Viktoriya Panfilova, "Uzbekistan Earned Almost $4 Billion at Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit. 
China Has Started Advancing Deep into Central Asia," Moscow Daily, 30 Jun 04, available via www.fbis.gov. 
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greatly reduced.  China has invested heavily in Central Asian markets.  As another facet 
of this strategy, the Chinese government has also used 9/11 to its advantage.  After 9/11 
the United States placed a Uyghur group on the U.S. State Department’s list of 
international terrorist groups, Beijing used this as a way to legitimately target Uyghurs 
under the guise of rooting out terrorists.   
C. OPPORTUNITY 
Beijing knows all to well that in times of a weakened state, social upheaval, or 
military conflict conditions are most conducive to political violence.  China’s history has 
proven that and Beijing has worked hard to create the strength of state to counter such 
possibilities.  Because of China’s experience its goal is to maintain strength of state and 
foster positive foreign relations, not only for itself, but also for its Central Asian 
neighbors.  China has labored hard to strengthen its economic, political, military, and soft 
power.  It has been effective at doing so and the results have been the reduction of 
opportunity for mass organized political violence in Xinjiang. 
The CCP has bet its legitimacy as a government on its economic reform policies 
being the solution to the problem of domestic stability and a weakened state.  This 
approach has worked so far.  China’s economic power continues to rise and its political 
influence is spreading throughout the world.  Economic growth rates of 9% or better 
continue and China’s economic boon has enabled it to become a donor of financial aid to 
developing countries, most importantly when evaluating the Xinjiang problem is the 
members of the SCO.  This political power will help ensure SCO member support for 
China should Beijing find itself in a weakened state or military conflict.  It will also 
ensure that attempts by other states to exert influence in the Central Asian region through 
unilateral means or international organizations will be negated by the SCO. 
China’s military power is also growing and it continues to expand its military 
contacts and exchanges.  It has conducted military training exercises with its SCO 
partners and continues to develop ties elsewhere in the region and in the globe.  Beijing’s 
military modernization effort, while considered threatening by some, also serves the 
purpose of creating domestic stability as well.  By maintaining a strong, modernized 
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military force Beijing can counter any moves by adjacent states to weaken its position 
through military confrontation.  Additionally, some observers believe that a confrontation 
across the Taiwan straits due to a Taiwanese declaration of independence might lead to 
such declarations in China’s provinces that have traditionally resisted Beijing's control, 
i.e. Xinjiang.  China’s military power from this standpoint must remain strong in order to 
avoid such a predicament.  Mil-to-mil cooperation with SCO and other western neighbors 
will help to limit opportunity for political violence in Xinjiang by ensuring SCO support 
should it be needed to control such a mass uprising. 
D. CONCLUSION 
China has several issues it must come to grips with in order to significantly reduce 
motive.  The primary issue is religious tolerance.  Beijing’s unwillingness to allow the 
Uyghurs and other Muslim Turks the ability to maintain their religion while participating 
in the political process will continue to drive a wedge in ethnic minority relations.  
Additionally, its inability to address social problems within Uyghur society to the 
satisfaction of traditional Uyghur leadership will only cause those leaders to maintain an 
underground civil society that the Chinese government cannot penetrate, much less 
destroy.  This civil society will always view that government as an adversary instead of 
an ally, and those Uyghurs who conform to the atheist requirements of the party will be 
viewed as party patsies.  An undercurrent of motive to rid Xinjiang of Chinese rule will 
continue as the situation continues this way. 
Furthermore, the government’s continued use of repressive tactics to handle 
minority discontent will only fuel motive and push more Uyghurs toward extreme 
methods of expressing frustration.  The point where an individual perceives that possible 
rewards of using political violence outweighs possible punishment varies from individual 
to individual and the ability of outside observers to determine when that point has been 
reached remains a mystery.  However, a person who feels that they have nothing to lose 
and everything to gain will not hesitate.  The Chinese government would be wise to bear 
this in mind when it so quickly sentences and executes political dissenters. 
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A secondary issue is minority language policies, which may have finally reached 
a correct solution to the language barrier that has hampered interethnic relations 
throughout the PRC period.  While there will always be opposition to change, bilingual 
education will allow Uyghurs and other minorities the ability to communicate in the 
official language of the PRC.  Regardless of the fact that many minorities find Han 
refusal to learn the minority languages offensive, the reciprocal attitude will only be 
detrimental to them.  the key to success for Uyghurs and other minorities who wish to 
attain successful careers and positions in society is ability to speak multiple languages.  
Minorities who can do so actually have an advantage over their Han counterparts, 
particularly in business, and as that generation of minorities enters the workforce, relative 
deprivation of opportunities due to language will be reduced. 
Finally, the “Develop the West” program has finally begun in Xinjiang what was 
started in the coastal regions over two decades ago.  China will continue to labor to bring 
economic benefits and political stability to Xinjiang.  These economic benefits alone will 
not ensure Beijing's success, but if Xinjiang’s minority population finds itself 
economically as well off as its Han counterparts and its kinsmen in surrounding Central 
Asian states, relative deprivation will not loom large as a motive for major organized 
political violence. 
Beijing has also successfully reduced means and opportunity through the use of 
economic incentives and political maneuvering and its continued rise a regional power 
will only strengthen its ability to do so.  China’s ever growing relationship within the 
SCO negates the support network for Xinjiang’s political dissidents that began to appear 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union and also provides economic and political partners 
who strive for security within Xinjiang and the rest of Central Asia.  So while China does 
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